JohnDonne wrote:Hanarchy Montanarchy wrote:JohnDonne wrote:
When defining the essence of something like ethics there's only so far in a chain of logic one can go before the terms become tautological.
So your ethics rests on the proposition that animals do not have the ability to understand moral obligation, and because of this there is no obligation for humans to treat them ethically, but you say humans can understand moral obligation and so there is obligation to treat them ethically. Okay. It would then stand to reason that a human without the cognitive ability to understand moral obligation would thus be on the same level as any animal that doesn't understand moral obligation, and any animal that demonstrates moral obligation would be on the level of a human.
Thankfully this is not society's standard for ethical value but I want to see how committed you are to this principle.
So if this isn't just a typical double standard argument, are you prepared to justify infanticide, or the murder of cognitively impaired humans, the severely retarded, or insane people, or psychopaths for nothing more than their apparent lack of understanding of moral obligation? Since your rule is partly a way to avoid your preconcluded "moral absurdities" that my rule supposedly creates, I'm curious as to your answer.
It becomes a civic a question when you and other people say that I'm imposing my beliefs on others in an immoral manner. This implies that I have some kind of legislative intent behind my arguments, which in fact I do, but to call any proposed law "forcing ones beliefs" on others is stupid. My point is the double standard hypocrisy, in that they will support legislation when they have a moral belief, such as the belief in human ethical value.
Are you saying you don't support laws against rape and murder, that even though you value humans as the only things worth having moral obligations for, you are against legislation which enforces those obligations? It would seem strange if you don't.
I don't have to come up with an argument for animals that doesn't at some point rest on a tautology until your argument for humans ceases to be one. Because until then, inasmuch as your argument that humans are valuable is true, my arguments that animals are valuable is also true, which has always been my point.
For your last point, it may be ridiculous to claim that men and women are as different from each other as beasts and men, but your claim that empathizing with animals is at best an imaginative leap and therefore animals don't need to be ethically considered is equally ridiculous, when all of empathy is a leap. Who are you to say I can put myself into an empathetic position of a stranger more than with my cat?
Again, my argument for morality between humans is descriptive, not normative. We, by all accounts, have a moral sense of obligation. If you believe in absolute parity, argue it, but don't shift the obligation of your normative claim on to my descriptive claim. If you want to abandon your moral sense of duties to humans if it can't be applied to animals, that is, as I argued, the problem with veganism.
And, again, you are asking my to justify not treating humans as animals on your assumption that intellect is somehow tied to morality. I don't think being severely retarded diminishes your humanity in a relevant way. My moral obligation to an infant is the same as my moral obligation to its parents. (If you want to claim you see all animals on earth the way a parent views their child, then you are simply a liar.) As far as psychopaths, they get the same treatment as everyone else, in that they are not punished for crimes they may commit. I think it is acceptable for us to exterminate psychopaths after they commit crimes.
You are arguing that parity is the source of morality, not me, so I don't have to prove the parity of human consciousness. Because I do not know what part of human consciousness is required for a moral sense, I don't know what you can remove from human experience to justify treating them like animals.
When I argue you are forcing your morality on others, I am referring to the fact that you were perfectly willing to justify threatening a human over the well being of a cow. No consideration for law required. You are proselytizing here, at least own it.
If you want to argue that you can make the imaginative leap of empathy to non human animals as easily as human animals, again, I think that is patently silly. You have human experiences that it is reasonable to assume track well with other human's experience. You have no reason to assume it tracks at all well with chicken experience, but you are free to make that claim, just don't pretend it is reasonable. For you to make it a rational claim, you have to make a rational argument for absolute parity of consciousness, because you have already acknowledged a deer mind and a human mind aren't the same, I assume you are unable to do this.
Ok, I think I see what you're saying. You are saying that
it is the case that humans are the only known being that can understand moral obligation which puts them into a unique "moral sphere."
I'll entertain the idea. I'll refrain from citing evidence of animals acting out of morality and instead take your description at face value.
Here's my descriptive statement: Humans that comprehend moral obligation at times feel obligated towards other creatures and humans that cannot comprehend moral obligation. Moral obligation implies that there is an ethical value one is obligated towards. It follows that a creature need not comprehend moral obligation to have ethical value. And like you, I need no objective ethics or parity to come to this conclusion, it's all based in descriptive, observable ethics.
So one that would argue that we
ought to exclude animals from ethical consideration
because they supposedly cannot comprehend moral obligation is faced with a dilemma. Either be consistent and disregard humans that are lacking comprehension of ethical obligations, or admit that this is
not the ethically relevant attribute, on a descriptive or normative level. (This places the burden of proof back on you because you are asserting that animals are not at all ethically valuable when it is descriptively not the case since humans act with obligation towards them and thus you were either wrong in your assertion or you were making a normative statement.)
Here's another descriptive statement: It is the case that human moral obligation as it manifests exists only in relation to sentience, whether it be human or as in the case with pets and other circumstance, with animals. Because humans descriptively demonstrate an equality of moral obligation to humans with minds as divergent in attributes as those of certain animals are different to humans, it follows that the divergence of those attributes are not morally relevant, thus I need not establish a mental equivalence in those irrelevant attributes to observe that they are equally in possession of the attribute that is descriptively of concern to human moral obligation, namely, sentience.
So it would follow in a descriptive way then that human moral obligation as it can be observed is concerned with sentience.
So that would place the burden of proof on you of why would it be ethical to violate moral obligations?
People feel moral obligations towards inanimate objects like religious icons all the time. You don't accept their moral obligations as your own. The problem is the assumption that a moral obligation felt by anyone
should be felt by everyone.
I know there are all sorts of observations of what appears like morality or altruism in animals. I find it all very unconvincing, but that isn't the point. The point is that we know what it is like to have a human conscience, any assumption that other animals have it is unfounded. But nothing really important hinges on this.
Here are the nuts and bolts:
Descriptive statement 1: Humans comprehend morality
Descriptive statement 2: Human minds are different than other animals'
Normative statement: Humans should be an ethical priority
I hypothesize that the first statement is one of the main explanation for the second, but my moral universe doesn't really change if this isn't the case.
I am not even arguing that our moral obligations towards humans are absolutely equivalent. For instance, my obligation to my family is different than my obligation to strangers. I think it is Singer who argues for absolute parity of moral obligations to humans... I believe he is also woefully misguided, for the same reasons I think veganism is misguided.
The morality of veganism is procrustean, and the result of this always seems to be corrosive to human empathy. By all means, continue to feel moral obligations to animals, just as some feel the need to kiss bow before icons. Obligations don't transfer. I don't need to
ought my way out of any specific moral obligation to animals just because you are trying to
ought me into one.
As a bit of an olive branch, I think you are right, and that our moral obligations to proven psychopaths are roughly equivalent to our moral obligations to animals. Kill them quickly and without cruelty or malice wherever possible. The only difference is we probably shouldn't et'em.
(Also, StA: Tried a baked salmon with a honey-soy glaze the other night with the old lady. You were right, it was easy as hell and off the charts delicious. Seafood is back on the menu; I am, forever, in your debt.)