Europe, Boring Until it's Not

[Hanarchy Montanarchy]

I suppose I don't necessarily argue that consciousness should be considered ethically valuable, or that intrinsic value should necessarily matter. My argument is more that the chicken's consciousness is ethically valuable inasmuch as a human's consciousness is valuable and vice versa. I am arguing that the reason the descendants of the enlightenment already value human life as something that is ethically worth consideration even when it fails to produce extrinsic value to other humans, such as an invalid, is because they recognize that this is a consciousness able to value itself, making it intrinsically valuable and distinct from all other things in the known universe. You are correct that my attempt to go any further in this thought leads to tautology, I could also resort to the refuge of religion and mysticism, instead I will admit I don't know why it is the case that we value people because they can value themselves. Yet I have observed that it is the case.

Now you may object that I am mistaken, there is something else in the human totality which sets it apart from the chicken, the intelligence, perhaps, or the capacity to ponder.
Yet for every instance of human ingenuity there is a great exception which defies the claim and hangs onto that same ethical consideration.

Suppose we are sailing on an ethical ship which applies the standard that human life is valuable because it can value itself, (I do not argue whether it is right or wrong, true or mistaken for us to do this, only that I notice that we do.) Noticing that the chicken is in possession of these same fundamental attributes of consciousness and self-value I put forth the claim, either it is denied that chicken has the attribute or it is denied (as you deny) that the attribute is the reason humans are valued. Upon hearing this I ask for the true attribute which makes humans matter. I am given an answer, someone shouts, "the ability to reason!"
At this I accept the claim immediately and point the gun at the head of an invalid human who can reason no more than a cat, but suddenly they say that the invalid is still ethically valuable. So I ask for another attribute. And so on and so on to no avail, for the human exception in every instance is considered too valuable to kill. Is it by some sentimentality or misapprehension I ask, or is it that human society instinctively recognizes that self-value is what makes a thing ethically considerable? I suggest it is the latter, for there is the case of the brain dead human, a fully functioning body, but without a consciousness able to value itself, and these cases are considered dead and lacking the intrinsic value, whereas the invalid who reasons no more than a cat is considered as valuable as any human.

Suppose you admit that the chicken has a limited version of the human consciousnesses' intangible value, that we may consider the chicken one hundreth of a human, but that would make as much sense as trying to pour one hundreth of a cup of infinity, or to split eternity asunder.

If we are going to base our ethical obligations on the idea that consciousness values itself, then I think we hit an impasse where I place the burden on you to prove that there are no meaningful differences in kinds of consciousness, and you place it on me to prove that there are.

But, I am not certain that is actually the source of our ethical obligations. Something that seems to set humans apart from other animals, in a morally relevant way, is that they are able to reciprocate ethical obligations. (This doesn't lead to a cynical, consequentialist, exchange because my behavior can be virtuous without any hope of actual reciprocity, and, in fact, seems to be more virtuous without it.)

I am suspicious of the idea that self-regard is the sine qua non of ethics simply because my ethical obligation towards another human doesn't disappear if that human is suicidal, or otherwise deficient in self-regard.

This saves us from the troublesome task of trying to dial in the threshold of intellect required for morality. Even with the cleverest non-human creatures, we don't consider their obligations to us, so any ethical impulse I feel towards them is either A) anthropomorphic, or B) an attempt to limit the amount of cruelty I visit upon a conscious mind, which can be viewed (as we discussed earlier) as more an obligation to my own well being than the chicken's.

If, as you say, your altruism is more virtuous without hope of reciprocity then why would the ability to reciprocate ethical obligations be the relevant part, as opposed to the ability to engage in altruism by itself? (Though I would disagree with that as well) The point may be moot, as I understand it animals engage in reciprocal altruism as well as just plain old altruism. It seems that our own ethical hard wiring evolved on a continuum with other species.

The suicidal are an interesting case. I think it can be argued that a suicidal person isn't someone lacking self-value but is rather someone that is afflicted by a torment, and it is in fact a clear sign of self-value that they wish to end said torment out of regard for the quality of their being, even if it means ending their being. If I am completely wrong about this, see next point.

I should have been more clear in that I think ethics concerns the ability of a being to self-value, as opposed to just having self-value. After all, it would be silly of me to argue that every time someone goes unconscious they lose their ethical value. But as in the case of brain death, if the ability is lost forever then the value is lost as well, or in the case of the fetus, the rationalist becomes concerned with the ethics of abortion around the time the brain of the fetus develops.

You are right that it would be much simpler to decide that any creature which we do not consider obligated to us ethically is not something to be ethically considered. But I think that would lead again to problems in certain exceptional humans in which obligation is a one way street, babies, the severely disabled, and so on. You could argue that we should just take care of those things for some other reason that isn't really about ethics, keeping up appearances or some such, but I don't think it would be a very satisfying answer.

I'm not really talking about 'where our ethical obligations come from' in an evolutionary sense. I don't think an evolutionarily beneficial sense of reciprocal altruism accounts for human level morality, which is why I am comfortable placing humans in an entirely different moral universe.

To put this another way, do you believe the other predators and omnivores of the world have an ethical obligation to me? If not, what accounts for the difference?

(Also, I am not sure if being severely disabled means you lose your moral capacity. Infants are a different story altogether, but since you and I have already derailed this into a veganism discussion, I feel guilty about derailing it further into a 'life of the child' discussion, from which we can be sure there is no possible thread re-railing for our poor forum-mates who actually give a shit about boring-ass Europe.)

[Speaker to Animals]

How about those Leafs?

[Hanarchy Montanarchy]

reported

[Montegriffo]

If we are going to base our ethical obligations on the idea that consciousness values itself, then I think we hit an impasse where I place the burden on you to prove that there are no meaningful differences in kinds of consciousness, and you place it on me to prove that there are.

But, I am not certain that is actually the source of our ethical obligations. Something that seems to set humans apart from other animals, in a morally relevant way, is that they are able to reciprocate ethical obligations. (This doesn't lead to a cynical, consequentialist, exchange because my behavior can be virtuous without any hope of actual reciprocity, and, in fact, seems to be more virtuous without it.)

I am suspicious of the idea that self-regard is the sine qua non of ethics simply because my ethical obligation towards another human doesn't disappear if that human is suicidal, or otherwise deficient in self-regard.

This saves us from the troublesome task of trying to dial in the threshold of intellect required for morality. Even with the cleverest non-human creatures, we don't consider their obligations to us, so any ethical impulse I feel towards them is either A) anthropomorphic, or B) an attempt to limit the amount of cruelty I visit upon a conscious mind, which can be viewed (as we discussed earlier) as more an obligation to my own well being than the chicken's.

If, as you say, your altruism is more virtuous without hope of reciprocity then why would the ability to reciprocate ethical obligations be the relevant part, as opposed to the ability to engage in altruism by itself? (Though I would disagree with that as well) The point may be moot, as I understand it animals engage in reciprocal altruism as well as just plain old altruism. It seems that our own ethical hard wiring evolved on a continuum with other species.

The suicidal are an interesting case. I think it can be argued that a suicidal person isn't someone lacking self-value but is rather someone that is afflicted by a torment, and it is in fact a clear sign of self-value that they wish to end said torment out of regard for the quality of their being, even if it means ending their being. If I am completely wrong about this, see next point.

I should have been more clear in that I think ethics concerns the ability of a being to self-value, as opposed to just having self-value. After all, it would be silly of me to argue that every time someone goes unconscious they lose their ethical value. But as in the case of brain death, if the ability is lost forever then the value is lost as well, or in the case of the fetus, the rationalist becomes concerned with the ethics of abortion around the time the brain of the fetus develops.

You are right that it would be much simpler to decide that any creature which we do not consider obligated to us ethically is not something to be ethically considered. But I think that would lead again to problems in certain exceptional humans in which obligation is a one way street, babies, the severely disabled, and so on. You could argue that we should just take care of those things for some other reason that isn't really about ethics, keeping up appearances or some such, but I don't think it would be a very satisfying answer.

I'm not really talking about 'where our ethical obligations come from' in an evolutionary sense. I don't think an evolutionarily beneficial sense of reciprocal altruism accounts for human level morality, which is why I am comfortable placing humans in an entirely different moral universe.

To put this another way, do you believe the other predators and omnivores of the world have an ethical obligation to me? If not, what accounts for the difference?

(Also, I am not sure if being severely disabled means you lose your moral capacity. Infants are a different story altogether, but since you and I have already derailed this into a veganism discussion, I feel guilty about derailing it further into a 'life of the child' discussion, from which we can be sure there is no possible thread re-railing for our poor forum-mates who actually give a shit about boring-ass Europe.)

No please derail this usually toxic thread. Besides this all comes from the Fen farm incident which was in Europe.

[TheReal_ND]

Yes. It's a refreshing change from chronicling the Islamic conquest of Eurabia.

[JohnDonne]

If we are going to base our ethical obligations on the idea that consciousness values itself, then I think we hit an impasse where I place the burden on you to prove that there are no meaningful differences in kinds of consciousness, and you place it on me to prove that there are.

But, I am not certain that is actually the source of our ethical obligations. Something that seems to set humans apart from other animals, in a morally relevant way, is that they are able to reciprocate ethical obligations. (This doesn't lead to a cynical, consequentialist, exchange because my behavior can be virtuous without any hope of actual reciprocity, and, in fact, seems to be more virtuous without it.)

I am suspicious of the idea that self-regard is the sine qua non of ethics simply because my ethical obligation towards another human doesn't disappear if that human is suicidal, or otherwise deficient in self-regard.

This saves us from the troublesome task of trying to dial in the threshold of intellect required for morality. Even with the cleverest non-human creatures, we don't consider their obligations to us, so any ethical impulse I feel towards them is either A) anthropomorphic, or B) an attempt to limit the amount of cruelty I visit upon a conscious mind, which can be viewed (as we discussed earlier) as more an obligation to my own well being than the chicken's.

If, as you say, your altruism is more virtuous without hope of reciprocity then why would the ability to reciprocate ethical obligations be the relevant part, as opposed to the ability to engage in altruism by itself? (Though I would disagree with that as well) The point may be moot, as I understand it animals engage in reciprocal altruism as well as just plain old altruism. It seems that our own ethical hard wiring evolved on a continuum with other species.

The suicidal are an interesting case. I think it can be argued that a suicidal person isn't someone lacking self-value but is rather someone that is afflicted by a torment, and it is in fact a clear sign of self-value that they wish to end said torment out of regard for the quality of their being, even if it means ending their being. If I am completely wrong about this, see next point.

I should have been more clear in that I think ethics concerns the ability of a being to self-value, as opposed to just having self-value. After all, it would be silly of me to argue that every time someone goes unconscious they lose their ethical value. But as in the case of brain death, if the ability is lost forever then the value is lost as well, or in the case of the fetus, the rationalist becomes concerned with the ethics of abortion around the time the brain of the fetus develops.

You are right that it would be much simpler to decide that any creature which we do not consider obligated to us ethically is not something to be ethically considered. But I think that would lead again to problems in certain exceptional humans in which obligation is a one way street, babies, the severely disabled, and so on. You could argue that we should just take care of those things for some other reason that isn't really about ethics, keeping up appearances or some such, but I don't think it would be a very satisfying answer.

I'm not really talking about 'where our ethical obligations come from' in an evolutionary sense. I don't think an evolutionarily beneficial sense of reciprocal altruism accounts for human level morality, which is why I am comfortable placing humans in an entirely different moral universe.

To put this another way, do you believe the other predators and omnivores of the world have an ethical obligation to me? If not, what accounts for the difference?

(Also, I am not sure if being severely disabled means you lose your moral capacity. Infants are a different story altogether, but since you and I have already derailed this into a veganism discussion, I feel guilty about derailing it further into a 'life of the child' discussion, from which we can be sure there is no possible thread re-railing for our poor forum-mates who actually give a shit about boring-ass Europe.)

I would say animals do have ethical obligations but that they exist in relation to their circumstance, as all ethical obligations do. It happens that their circumstances are such that were a human being placed in their position, they would be considered culpable of almost nothing. It is by this standard I propose to judge their actions, and this standard by which I insist to judge human’s. For there is an ethical distinction between killing out of survival and killing without a need for survival, acting out of ignorance and acting out of knowledge.

[Hanarchy Montanarchy]

If, as you say, your altruism is more virtuous without hope of reciprocity then why would the ability to reciprocate ethical obligations be the relevant part, as opposed to the ability to engage in altruism by itself? (Though I would disagree with that as well) The point may be moot, as I understand it animals engage in reciprocal altruism as well as just plain old altruism. It seems that our own ethical hard wiring evolved on a continuum with other species.

The suicidal are an interesting case. I think it can be argued that a suicidal person isn't someone lacking self-value but is rather someone that is afflicted by a torment, and it is in fact a clear sign of self-value that they wish to end said torment out of regard for the quality of their being, even if it means ending their being. If I am completely wrong about this, see next point.

I should have been more clear in that I think ethics concerns the ability of a being to self-value, as opposed to just having self-value. After all, it would be silly of me to argue that every time someone goes unconscious they lose their ethical value. But as in the case of brain death, if the ability is lost forever then the value is lost as well, or in the case of the fetus, the rationalist becomes concerned with the ethics of abortion around the time the brain of the fetus develops.

You are right that it would be much simpler to decide that any creature which we do not consider obligated to us ethically is not something to be ethically considered. But I think that would lead again to problems in certain exceptional humans in which obligation is a one way street, babies, the severely disabled, and so on. You could argue that we should just take care of those things for some other reason that isn't really about ethics, keeping up appearances or some such, but I don't think it would be a very satisfying answer.

I'm not really talking about 'where our ethical obligations come from' in an evolutionary sense. I don't think an evolutionarily beneficial sense of reciprocal altruism accounts for human level morality, which is why I am comfortable placing humans in an entirely different moral universe.

To put this another way, do you believe the other predators and omnivores of the world have an ethical obligation to me? If not, what accounts for the difference?

(Also, I am not sure if being severely disabled means you lose your moral capacity. Infants are a different story altogether, but since you and I have already derailed this into a veganism discussion, I feel guilty about derailing it further into a 'life of the child' discussion, from which we can be sure there is no possible thread re-railing for our poor forum-mates who actually give a shit about boring-ass Europe.)

I would say animals do have ethical obligations but that they exist in relation to their circumstance, as all ethical obligations do. It happens that their circumstances are such that were a human being placed in their position, they would be considered culpable of almost nothing. It is by this standard I propose to judge their actions, and this standard by which I insist to judge human’s. For there is an ethical distinction between killing out of survival and killing without a need for survival, acting out of ignorance and acting out of knowledge.

I'm not sure I agree with any of that, but it would be very hard for me to argue that it is absolutely certain that other predators lack ethics. I doubt it, but if you want to really commit to that principle, go bananas.

But, even if we accept most of those contentions, it looks like you don't really have an ethical problem with the fact the world is divided into predators and prey, and accept that reality defines our ethical obligations. If we are going to judge every animal on earth by the same standard, then omnivores and carnivores aren't really morally culpable for merely being omnivores or carnivores.

Now, I think you can make a strong case that our methods are pretty morally suspect... factory farming, deforestation, et cetera. Likewise, you can be morally repulsed by sweatshops, and not be morally obliged to nudity.

[JohnDonne]

I'm not really talking about 'where our ethical obligations come from' in an evolutionary sense. I don't think an evolutionarily beneficial sense of reciprocal altruism accounts for human level morality, which is why I am comfortable placing humans in an entirely different moral universe.

To put this another way, do you believe the other predators and omnivores of the world have an ethical obligation to me? If not, what accounts for the difference?

(Also, I am not sure if being severely disabled means you lose your moral capacity. Infants are a different story altogether, but since you and I have already derailed this into a veganism discussion, I feel guilty about derailing it further into a 'life of the child' discussion, from which we can be sure there is no possible thread re-railing for our poor forum-mates who actually give a shit about boring-ass Europe.)

I would say animals do have ethical obligations but that they exist in relation to their circumstance, as all ethical obligations do. It happens that their circumstances are such that were a human being placed in their position, they would be considered culpable of almost nothing. It is by this standard I propose to judge their actions, and this standard by which I insist to judge human’s. For there is an ethical distinction between killing out of survival and killing without a need for survival, acting out of ignorance and acting out of knowledge.

I'm not sure I agree with any of that, but it would be very hard for me to argue that it is absolutely certain that other predators lack ethics. I doubt it, but if you want to really commit to that principle, go bananas.

But, even if we accept most of those contentions, it looks like you don't really have an ethical problem with the fact the world is divided into predators and prey, and accept that reality defines our ethical obligations. If we are going to judge every animal on earth by the same standard, then omnivores and carnivores aren't really morally culpable for merely being omnivores or carnivores.

Now, I think you can make a strong case that our methods are pretty morally suspect... factory farming, deforestation, et cetera. Likewise, you can be morally repulsed by sweatshops, and not be morally obliged to nudity.

An animal or a human is not culpable merely for being omnivorous or carnivorous, no, as I said, their circumstances matter. The element of necessity matters.

Generally, the reason cruelty in factory farming is considered morally suspect is because it is understood to be unnecessarily cruel, were it absolutely necessary we could rightfully shrug it off as something we dislike but have to do anyway. For who would argue against a thing that has no alternative?

Now, it is just the same with meat itself. The reason it is widely argued against as cruel now, instead of a thousand years ago is because we don't need it anymore, we lose more resources than we gain in creating it, it is a luxury more to do with taste buds than sustenance. Thus is cannot be justified on grounds of necessity, anymore than factory farming cruelty can.

[Hanarchy Montanarchy]

I would say animals do have ethical obligations but that they exist in relation to their circumstance, as all ethical obligations do. It happens that their circumstances are such that were a human being placed in their position, they would be considered culpable of almost nothing. It is by this standard I propose to judge their actions, and this standard by which I insist to judge human’s. For there is an ethical distinction between killing out of survival and killing without a need for survival, acting out of ignorance and acting out of knowledge.

I'm not sure I agree with any of that, but it would be very hard for me to argue that it is absolutely certain that other predators lack ethics. I doubt it, but if you want to really commit to that principle, go bananas.

But, even if we accept most of those contentions, it looks like you don't really have an ethical problem with the fact the world is divided into predators and prey, and accept that reality defines our ethical obligations. If we are going to judge every animal on earth by the same standard, then omnivores and carnivores aren't really morally culpable for merely being omnivores or carnivores.

Now, I think you can make a strong case that our methods are pretty morally suspect... factory farming, deforestation, et cetera. Likewise, you can be morally repulsed by sweatshops, and not be morally obliged to nudity.

An animal or a human is not culpable merely for being omnivorous or carnivorous, no, as I said, their circumstances matter. The element of necessity matters.

Generally, the reason cruelty in factory farming is considered morally suspect is because it is understood to be unnecessarily cruel, were it absolutely necessary we could rightfully shrug it off as something we dislike but have to do anyway. For who would argue against a thing that has no alternative?

Now, it is just the same with meat itself. The reason it is widely argued against as cruel now, instead of a thousand years ago is because we don't need it anymore, we lose more resources than we gain in creating it, it is a luxury more to do with taste buds than sustenance. Thus is cannot be justified on grounds of necessity, anymore than factory farming cruelty can.

This seems to hinge on if humans need animal protein to be healthy. Anecdotally, I had a diet free from animal proteins for a long time, but eventually found that was incompatible with my health and fitness. I would argue that it is more of a luxury to have the free time and resources required to maintain a healthy vegan diet than it is to consume animal protein.
This is a more empirical debate though, and I am not a doctor or a nutritionist. Unfortunately, it would seem that reliable experts disagree on the point, so I have a hard time drawing a conclusion on this front.

[JohnDonne]

I'm not sure I agree with any of that, but it would be very hard for me to argue that it is absolutely certain that other predators lack ethics. I doubt it, but if you want to really commit to that principle, go bananas.

But, even if we accept most of those contentions, it looks like you don't really have an ethical problem with the fact the world is divided into predators and prey, and accept that reality defines our ethical obligations. If we are going to judge every animal on earth by the same standard, then omnivores and carnivores aren't really morally culpable for merely being omnivores or carnivores.

Now, I think you can make a strong case that our methods are pretty morally suspect... factory farming, deforestation, et cetera. Likewise, you can be morally repulsed by sweatshops, and not be morally obliged to nudity.

An animal or a human is not culpable merely for being omnivorous or carnivorous, no, as I said, their circumstances matter. The element of necessity matters.

Generally, the reason cruelty in factory farming is considered morally suspect is because it is understood to be unnecessarily cruel, were it absolutely necessary we could rightfully shrug it off as something we dislike but have to do anyway. For who would argue against a thing that has no alternative?

Now, it is just the same with meat itself. The reason it is widely argued against as cruel now, instead of a thousand years ago is because we don't need it anymore, we lose more resources than we gain in creating it, it is a luxury more to do with taste buds than sustenance. Thus is cannot be justified on grounds of necessity, anymore than factory farming cruelty can.

This seems to hinge on if humans need animal protein to be healthy. Anecdotally, I had a diet free from animal proteins for a long time, but eventually found that was incompatible with my health and fitness. I would argue that it is more of a luxury to have the free time and resources required to maintain a healthy vegan diet than it is to consume animal protein.
This is a more empirical debate though, and I am not a doctor or a nutritionist. Unfortunately, it would seem that reliable experts disagree on the point, so I have a hard time drawing a conclusion on this front.

Nutritional information in favor of veganism is in the majority I believe. But like you I feel no inclination to engage in a cherry-picking competition as most nutritional arguments seem to devolve into. I will say I view the plethora of healthy vegan examples out there as living proof that veganism supports healthy human life. I assume myself and other vegans are not physical as well as ideological anomalies, we are of the same biology and genes as our meat eating brethren with varying levels of success. We do not expect from others what we do not expect from ourselves. We ask for scientific proof that meat is a requirement for humanity. Though the point will be moot in a few years when in vitro meat hits the shelves.