Europe, Boring Until it's Not

[Montegriffo]

LONDON — When it comes to cocktail ingredients, meat is probably the last thing you'd expect to find in your tipple. But, that's all changing with the arrival of 2016's biggest — and most bonkers — cocktail trend: meat cocktails.

Gone are the days of a straight-up martini with a twist; people are ditching cocktail bar staples in favour of something meatier, and we're not just talking about the post-pub kebab

This is not one for the faint of heart. London restaurant Duck & Waffle's foie gras and salted caramel Manhattan comprises Jack Daniels whiskey, infused with foie gras, a vermouth blend, salted caramel and maple.

PKD's Meaty Mary cocktail is made with vodka infused with topside of beef and a splash of gravy.

For their Bloody Caesar cocktail, staff cook smoked pork fat for a few days until it's reduced down to a rich liquid, before infusing vodka with the juices. They add 'clamato' juice to the mix — that's tomato juice and clam broth — and garnish it with a strip of crispy maple cured bacon.

OK I see it now, Europe has gone mad.

[Speaker to Animals]

Oh wow. A huge amount of carbs with a large dose of saturated fats and no protein. Heart disease cocktails.

[Montegriffo]

What next?
Beef 52
Stewdriver
Horses neck - containing actual horse
Duckquiri
Margameata

[Montegriffo]

Musselini?
I'm not looking forward to ordering my favourite cocktail - a Grasshopper.

[JohnDonne]

Supposing I am a chicken. Certainly, you can choose not to recognize that my life is valuable to myself, but that would be untrue since it is, and thus your ethical considerations would be founded on a false premise.

If you admit that I value my life, but assert that you do not hold it to be valuable to yourself, you've still admitted that my life is of value, at least to me. Your lack of value for my life does not negate the value I have for my own, anymore than non-existence negates existence.

The foundation of any value is the conscious determiner which deems things to matter or not. The chicken valuing its own life is valuing the mechanism by which value is created, a matteringness, so to speak.

Either my life being of value to itself is enough to create an intrinsic value, for moral value is only in relation to consciousness, or there is no intrinsic value. If there is no intrinsic value there is no ethical considerations. But your premise that humans are superior to chickens admits an ethical dimension. So there is intrinsic value and there is ethical considerations. Now your consideration is whether you are justified to kill the chicken for protein. You claim to have the justifications by reason of some measure of superiority which you have yet to outline. I am quite certain the criteria you will choose for judging chicken consciousness as less ethically considerable than human consciousness will amount to a distinction without much difference, but will rather be an exercise in rigging the game to turn up human.

Why must ethics only be concerned with 'intrinsic' value?
The first four sentences of your final paragraph look like a staggering tautology to me, but if you have an argument for why intrinsic values are the only ones we need to be ethically concerned about, I would be open to hearing it.

I am not at all certain that the bright line between intrinsic and extrinsic, or arbitrary and definite value is all that useful a distinction, ethically speaking. I would call my happiness intrinsically valuable, but that doesn't mean that it always has more ethical weight than the extrinsic value of the coin in your pocket.

We seem to get hung up on the idea that I reject the notion that a chicken values it's own life. Quite the opposite, I assume the chicken places the maximum possible value on it's own life. I am just not convinced that the chicken valuing its own life is a sufficient condition for me having any moral obligation to the chicken, even if we define the chickens self-value as universally 'intrinsic.'

I suppose I don't necessarily argue that consciousness should be considered ethically valuable, or that intrinsic value should necessarily matter. My argument is more that the chicken's consciousness is ethically valuable inasmuch as a human's consciousness is valuable and vice versa. I am arguing that the reason the descendants of the enlightenment already value human life as something that is ethically worth consideration even when it fails to produce extrinsic value to other humans, such as an invalid, is because they recognize that this is a consciousness able to value itself, making it intrinsically valuable and distinct from all other things in the known universe. You are correct that my attempt to go any further in this thought leads to tautology, I could also resort to the refuge of religion and mysticism, instead I will admit I don't know why it is the case that we value people because they can value themselves. Yet I have observed that it is the case.

Now you may object that I am mistaken, there is something else in the human totality which sets it apart from the chicken, the intelligence, perhaps, or the capacity to ponder.
Yet for every instance of human ingenuity there is a great exception which defies the claim and hangs onto that same ethical consideration.

Suppose we are sailing on an ethical ship which applies the standard that human life is valuable because it can value itself, (I do not argue whether it is right or wrong, true or mistaken for us to do this, only that I notice that we do.) Noticing that the chicken is in possession of these same fundamental attributes of consciousness and self-value I put forth the claim, either it is denied that chicken has the attribute or it is denied (as you deny) that the attribute is the reason humans are valued. Upon hearing this I ask for the true attribute which makes humans matter. I am given an answer, someone shouts, "the ability to reason!"
At this I accept the claim immediately and point the gun at the head of an invalid human who can reason no more than a cat, but suddenly they say that the invalid is still ethically valuable. So I ask for another attribute. And so on and so on to no avail, for the human exception in every instance is considered too valuable to kill. Is it by some sentimentality or misapprehension I ask, or is it that human society instinctively recognizes that self-value is what makes a thing ethically considerable? I suggest it is the latter, for there is the case of the brain dead human, a fully functioning body, but without a consciousness able to value itself, and these cases are considered dead and lacking the intrinsic value, whereas the invalid who reasons no more than a cat is considered as valuable as any human.

Suppose you admit that the chicken has a limited version of the human consciousnesses' intangible value, that we may consider the chicken one hundreth of a human, but that would make as much sense as trying to pour one hundreth of a cup of infinity, or to split eternity asunder.

[TheReal_ND]

OY M8

DONT BE A MESS BIN THAT TEST

[Hanarchy Montanarchy]

Supposing I am a chicken. Certainly, you can choose not to recognize that my life is valuable to myself, but that would be untrue since it is, and thus your ethical considerations would be founded on a false premise.

If you admit that I value my life, but assert that you do not hold it to be valuable to yourself, you've still admitted that my life is of value, at least to me. Your lack of value for my life does not negate the value I have for my own, anymore than non-existence negates existence.

The foundation of any value is the conscious determiner which deems things to matter or not. The chicken valuing its own life is valuing the mechanism by which value is created, a matteringness, so to speak.

Either my life being of value to itself is enough to create an intrinsic value, for moral value is only in relation to consciousness, or there is no intrinsic value. If there is no intrinsic value there is no ethical considerations. But your premise that humans are superior to chickens admits an ethical dimension. So there is intrinsic value and there is ethical considerations. Now your consideration is whether you are justified to kill the chicken for protein. You claim to have the justifications by reason of some measure of superiority which you have yet to outline. I am quite certain the criteria you will choose for judging chicken consciousness as less ethically considerable than human consciousness will amount to a distinction without much difference, but will rather be an exercise in rigging the game to turn up human.

Why must ethics only be concerned with 'intrinsic' value?
The first four sentences of your final paragraph look like a staggering tautology to me, but if you have an argument for why intrinsic values are the only ones we need to be ethically concerned about, I would be open to hearing it.

I am not at all certain that the bright line between intrinsic and extrinsic, or arbitrary and definite value is all that useful a distinction, ethically speaking. I would call my happiness intrinsically valuable, but that doesn't mean that it always has more ethical weight than the extrinsic value of the coin in your pocket.

We seem to get hung up on the idea that I reject the notion that a chicken values it's own life. Quite the opposite, I assume the chicken places the maximum possible value on it's own life. I am just not convinced that the chicken valuing its own life is a sufficient condition for me having any moral obligation to the chicken, even if we define the chickens self-value as universally 'intrinsic.'

I suppose I don't necessarily argue that consciousness should be considered ethically valuable, or that intrinsic value should necessarily matter. My argument is more that the chicken's consciousness is ethically valuable inasmuch as a human's consciousness is valuable and vice versa. I am arguing that the reason the descendants of the enlightenment already value human life as something that is ethically worth consideration even when it fails to produce extrinsic value to other humans, such as an invalid, is because they recognize that this is a consciousness able to value itself, making it intrinsically valuable and distinct from all other things in the known universe. You are correct that my attempt to go any further in this thought leads to tautology, I could also resort to the refuge of religion and mysticism, instead I will admit I don't know why it is the case that we value people because they can value themselves. Yet I have observed that it is the case.

Now you may object that I am mistaken, there is something else in the human totality which sets it apart from the chicken, the intelligence, perhaps, or the capacity to ponder.
Yet for every instance of human ingenuity there is a great exception which defies the claim and hangs onto that same ethical consideration.

Suppose we are sailing on an ethical ship which applies the standard that human life is valuable because it can value itself, (I do not argue whether it is right or wrong, true or mistaken for us to do this, only that I notice that we do.) Noticing that the chicken is in possession of these same fundamental attributes of consciousness and self-value I put forth the claim, either it is denied that chicken has the attribute or it is denied (as you deny) that the attribute is the reason humans are valued. Upon hearing this I ask for the true attribute which makes humans matter. I am given an answer, someone shouts, "the ability to reason!"
At this I accept the claim immediately and point the gun at the head of an invalid human who can reason no more than a cat, but suddenly they say that the invalid is still ethically valuable. So I ask for another attribute. And so on and so on to no avail, for the human exception in every instance is considered too valuable to kill. Is it by some sentimentality or misapprehension I ask, or is it that human society instinctively recognizes that self-value is what makes a thing ethically considerable? I suggest it is the latter, for there is the case of the brain dead human, a fully functioning body, but without a consciousness able to value itself, and these cases are considered dead and lacking the intrinsic value, whereas the invalid who reasons no more than a cat is considered as valuable as any human.

Suppose you admit that the chicken has a limited version of the human consciousnesses' intangible value, that we may consider the chicken one hundreth of a human, but that would make as much sense as trying to pour one hundreth of a cup of infinity, or to split eternity asunder.

If we are going to base our ethical obligations on the idea that consciousness values itself, then I think we hit an impasse where I place the burden on you to prove that there are no meaningful differences in kinds of consciousness, and you place it on me to prove that there are.

But, I am not certain that is actually the source of our ethical obligations. Something that seems to set humans apart from other animals, in a morally relevant way, is that they are able to reciprocate ethical obligations. (This doesn't lead to a cynical, consequentialist, exchange because my behavior can be virtuous without any hope of actual reciprocity, and, in fact, seems to be more virtuous without it.)

I am suspicious of the idea that self-regard is the sine qua non of ethics simply because my ethical obligation towards another human doesn't disappear if that human is suicidal, or otherwise deficient in self-regard.

This saves us from the troublesome task of trying to dial in the threshold of intellect required for morality. Even with the cleverest non-human creatures, we don't consider their obligations to us, so any ethical impulse I feel towards them is either A) anthropomorphic, or B) an attempt to limit the amount of cruelty I visit upon a conscious mind, which can be viewed (as we discussed earlier) as more an obligation to my own well being than the chicken's.

[Montegriffo]

Not sure if it is relevant to the conversation but last year one of the chickens on the farm died. The other chickens ate it.

[Hanarchy Montanarchy]

Not sure if it is relevant to the conversation but last year one of the chickens on the farm died. The other chickens ate it.

VERY relevant... as far as I am concerned.

[JohnDonne]

Why must ethics only be concerned with 'intrinsic' value?
The first four sentences of your final paragraph look like a staggering tautology to me, but if you have an argument for why intrinsic values are the only ones we need to be ethically concerned about, I would be open to hearing it.

I am not at all certain that the bright line between intrinsic and extrinsic, or arbitrary and definite value is all that useful a distinction, ethically speaking. I would call my happiness intrinsically valuable, but that doesn't mean that it always has more ethical weight than the extrinsic value of the coin in your pocket.

We seem to get hung up on the idea that I reject the notion that a chicken values it's own life. Quite the opposite, I assume the chicken places the maximum possible value on it's own life. I am just not convinced that the chicken valuing its own life is a sufficient condition for me having any moral obligation to the chicken, even if we define the chickens self-value as universally 'intrinsic.'

I suppose I don't necessarily argue that consciousness should be considered ethically valuable, or that intrinsic value should necessarily matter. My argument is more that the chicken's consciousness is ethically valuable inasmuch as a human's consciousness is valuable and vice versa. I am arguing that the reason the descendants of the enlightenment already value human life as something that is ethically worth consideration even when it fails to produce extrinsic value to other humans, such as an invalid, is because they recognize that this is a consciousness able to value itself, making it intrinsically valuable and distinct from all other things in the known universe. You are correct that my attempt to go any further in this thought leads to tautology, I could also resort to the refuge of religion and mysticism, instead I will admit I don't know why it is the case that we value people because they can value themselves. Yet I have observed that it is the case.

Now you may object that I am mistaken, there is something else in the human totality which sets it apart from the chicken, the intelligence, perhaps, or the capacity to ponder.
Yet for every instance of human ingenuity there is a great exception which defies the claim and hangs onto that same ethical consideration.

Suppose we are sailing on an ethical ship which applies the standard that human life is valuable because it can value itself, (I do not argue whether it is right or wrong, true or mistaken for us to do this, only that I notice that we do.) Noticing that the chicken is in possession of these same fundamental attributes of consciousness and self-value I put forth the claim, either it is denied that chicken has the attribute or it is denied (as you deny) that the attribute is the reason humans are valued. Upon hearing this I ask for the true attribute which makes humans matter. I am given an answer, someone shouts, "the ability to reason!"
At this I accept the claim immediately and point the gun at the head of an invalid human who can reason no more than a cat, but suddenly they say that the invalid is still ethically valuable. So I ask for another attribute. And so on and so on to no avail, for the human exception in every instance is considered too valuable to kill. Is it by some sentimentality or misapprehension I ask, or is it that human society instinctively recognizes that self-value is what makes a thing ethically considerable? I suggest it is the latter, for there is the case of the brain dead human, a fully functioning body, but without a consciousness able to value itself, and these cases are considered dead and lacking the intrinsic value, whereas the invalid who reasons no more than a cat is considered as valuable as any human.

Suppose you admit that the chicken has a limited version of the human consciousnesses' intangible value, that we may consider the chicken one hundreth of a human, but that would make as much sense as trying to pour one hundreth of a cup of infinity, or to split eternity asunder.

If we are going to base our ethical obligations on the idea that consciousness values itself, then I think we hit an impasse where I place the burden on you to prove that there are no meaningful differences in kinds of consciousness, and you place it on me to prove that there are.

But, I am not certain that is actually the source of our ethical obligations. Something that seems to set humans apart from other animals, in a morally relevant way, is that they are able to reciprocate ethical obligations. (This doesn't lead to a cynical, consequentialist, exchange because my behavior can be virtuous without any hope of actual reciprocity, and, in fact, seems to be more virtuous without it.)

I am suspicious of the idea that self-regard is the sine qua non of ethics simply because my ethical obligation towards another human doesn't disappear if that human is suicidal, or otherwise deficient in self-regard.

This saves us from the troublesome task of trying to dial in the threshold of intellect required for morality. Even with the cleverest non-human creatures, we don't consider their obligations to us, so any ethical impulse I feel towards them is either A) anthropomorphic, or B) an attempt to limit the amount of cruelty I visit upon a conscious mind, which can be viewed (as we discussed earlier) as more an obligation to my own well being than the chicken's.

If, as you say, your altruism is more virtuous without hope of reciprocity then why would the ability to reciprocate ethical obligations be the relevant part, as opposed to the ability to engage in altruism by itself? (Though I would disagree with that as well) The point may be moot, as I understand it animals engage in reciprocal altruism as well as just plain old altruism. It seems that our own ethical hard wiring evolved on a continuum with other species.

The suicidal are an interesting case. I think it can be argued that a suicidal person isn't someone lacking self-value but is rather someone that is afflicted by a torment, and it is in fact a clear sign of self-value that they wish to end said torment out of regard for the quality of their being, even if it means ending their being. If I am completely wrong about this, see next point.

I should have been more clear in that I think ethics concerns the ability of a being to self-value, as opposed to just having self-value. After all, it would be silly of me to argue that every time someone goes unconscious they lose their ethical value. But as in the case of brain death, if the ability is lost forever then the value is lost as well, or in the case of the fetus, the rationalist becomes concerned with the ethics of abortion around the time the brain of the fetus develops.

You are right that it would be much simpler to decide that any creature which we do not consider obligated to us ethically is not something to be ethically considered. But I think that would lead again to problems in certain exceptional humans in which obligation is a one way street, babies, the severely disabled, and so on. You could argue that we should just take care of those things for some other reason that isn't really about ethics, keeping up appearances or some such, but I don't think it would be a very satisfying answer.