How's that Obamacare Repeal Working Out For You?

[Speaker to Animals]

Thought experiment:

Allow employees to choose between taking a voucher check to apply to private insurance on the open market or to accept their employer's plan. What do you think the average employee at a Fortune 500 company is going to choose? I.e. would he get a better plan through the company negotiating directly with an insurer or going to an open market where has ZERO LEVERAGE.

Zero leverage? That sounds quite like the Remainers argument. Isn't that voucher times everyone a form a leverage? It also appears to unchain the employee from the employer.

Not unless "everyone" organizes and negotiates for better plans as a group.

This is the same concept that organized labor uses to negotiate better salaries and benefits. If they all had to do it individually, then the employer has all the advantages. When they are allowed to organize and lock out scabs, then they have all the advantages.

[Haumana]

Thought experiment:

Allow employees to choose between taking a voucher check to apply to private insurance on the open market or to accept their employer's plan. What do you think the average employee at a Fortune 500 company is going to choose? I.e. would he get a better plan through the company negotiating directly with an insurer or going to an open market where has ZERO LEVERAGE.

Zero leverage? That sounds quite like the Remainers argument. Isn't that voucher times everyone a form a leverage? It also appears to unchain the employee from the employer.

Not unless "everyone" organizes and negotiates for better plans as a group.

This is the same concept that organized labor uses to negotiate better salaries and benefits. If they all had to do it individually, then the employer has all the advantages. When they are allowed to organize and lock out scabs, then they have all the advantages.

The same concept that currently has a stranglehold on the education system for a clearly sub par product? If they had to do it individually then wouldn't that remove the employer from the equation? Interesting is your use of the term scabs, you are a collectivist at heart, no?

[Speaker to Animals]

Zero leverage? That sounds quite like the Remainers argument. Isn't that voucher times everyone a form a leverage? It also appears to unchain the employee from the employer.

Not unless "everyone" organizes and negotiates for better plans as a group.

This is the same concept that organized labor uses to negotiate better salaries and benefits. If they all had to do it individually, then the employer has all the advantages. When they are allowed to organize and lock out scabs, then they have all the advantages.

The same concept that currently has a stranglehold on the education system for a clearly sub par product? If they had to do it individually then wouldn't that remove the employer from the equation? Interesting is your use of the term scabs, you are a collectivist at heart, no?

Same thing. I make no value judgment here. This is just the truth. Collective bargaining is the optimal strategy in cases like this.

[Haumana]

Same thing. I make no value judgment here. This is just the truth. Collective bargaining is the optimal strategy in cases like this.

Do you collectively bargain for auto insurance? What do you mean "cases like this?" Isn't this just another transaction?

[Speaker to Animals]

Same thing. I make no value judgment here. This is just the truth. Collective bargaining is the optimal strategy in cases like this.

Do you collectively bargain for auto insurance? What do you mean "cases like this?" Isn't this just another transaction?

In game theory.

Where you have one competitor against many, and the one competitor possesses most of the bargaining advantages, then the optimal strategy for the "many" is to organize as one and bargain collectively.

The power dynamic can actually invert too if the collective lines up all the corporate negotiators like an accordian, forcing them one-by-one to negotiate deals with the entire labor force.

[Haumana]

Same thing. I make no value judgment here. This is just the truth. Collective bargaining is the optimal strategy in cases like this.

Do you collectively bargain for auto insurance? What do you mean "cases like this?" Isn't this just another transaction?

In game theory.

Where you have one competitor against many, and the one competitor possesses most of the bargaining advantages, then the optimal strategy for the "many" is to organize as one and bargain collectively.

The power dynamic can actually invert too if the collective lines up all the corporate negotiators like an accordian, forcing them one-by-one to negotiate deals with the entire labor force.

You don't have one competitor though unless it is artificially limited. Now game theory out multiple competitors on each side of the equation. Multiple heath insurers vs multiple vouchers. What happens next, game theory speaking? You seem to be arguing in favor of exactly opposite of the that, wanting to funnel everyone into a single collective.

[Fife]

The whole stupid idea that the federal city decided to give tax benefits to employer-provided "insurance" in furtherance of an even more stupid plan to artificially depress wages is how we got in this boondoggle in the first place.

Comparing "healthcare" to any non-coercive "market" is apples-to-oranges. The reason that costs are out of control under our "insurance" based system is that customers/patients have no incentives to shop prices. Doctors and hospitals tell patients what they will buy, and either the state or an insurance company pays the bill.

The mere fact that patients/customers might have some tiny influence on the market through the freedom to pick among different third-party payers at least opens the door to some (if harshly limited) competition.

There are ways (viewtopic.php?p=267810#p267810) to really attack healthcare pricing and introduce real competition*, but who is going to break up the government-insurance company syndicate?

Baby steps.




*In fact, this is exactly what has happened in areas of healthcare not dominated by insurance.

LASIK is an elective procedure that’s not covered by insurance; and over the past two decades, quality has risen as prices have fallen. In 1997, a precursor to LASIK surgery that involved the surgeon wielding a knife cost $8,000. In 2012, a safer laser-guided surgery cost only about $3,800. Prices halved in 15 years even as quality rose.

Cosmetic surgery is similarly not often covered by insurance. From 1992 to 2012, cosmetic surgery costs rose only 30 percent. Adjusted for inflation, costs actually fell.

Even traditional surgery is less expensive when patients bypass insurance. In the Wall Street Journal, Jeffrey Singer tells the story of a patient who decreased his out-of-pocket surgical costs from $20,000 to $3,000 by negotiating price with the hospital on his own instead of relying on insurance.

Putting patients in charge of their own healthcare encourages them to be price-conscious. When this happens, service providers have an incentive to compete on price, and competition produces downward price pressure.

https://mises.org/wire/lower-health-car ... ry-freedom

[Speaker to Animals]

Do you collectively bargain for auto insurance? What do you mean "cases like this?" Isn't this just another transaction?

In game theory.

Where you have one competitor against many, and the one competitor possesses most of the bargaining advantages, then the optimal strategy for the "many" is to organize as one and bargain collectively.

The power dynamic can actually invert too if the collective lines up all the corporate negotiators like an accordian, forcing them one-by-one to negotiate deals with the entire labor force.

You don't have one competitor though unless it is artificially limited. Now game theory out multiple competitors on each side of the equation. Multiple heath insurers vs multiple vouchers. What happens next, game theory speaking? You seem to be arguing in favor of exactly opposite of the that, wanting to funnel everyone into a single collective.

The problem with your reasoning is this:

You assume that the number of health insurers and the number of consumers is equal, and that they individually possess relatively equivalent bargaining power. That simply is untrue and can never be true.



If you wanted to maximize value to consumers, then you'd organize all consumers into a single collective that then bargains individually with each insurance company for plans in such a way that the people doing the bargaining on behalf of the consumers actually represent the consumers' interests. This is obviously an ideal that is not achievable. But it shows you the general direction of optimal strategies for consumers.

The problem with being too optimal for consumers, though, is that -- like labor unions -- they can get too good of a deal and drive the companies out of business. Then we are all screwed.

[Haumana]

In game theory.

Where you have one competitor against many, and the one competitor possesses most of the bargaining advantages, then the optimal strategy for the "many" is to organize as one and bargain collectively.

The power dynamic can actually invert too if the collective lines up all the corporate negotiators like an accordian, forcing them one-by-one to negotiate deals with the entire labor force.

You don't have one competitor though unless it is artificially limited. Now game theory out multiple competitors on each side of the equation. Multiple heath insurers vs multiple vouchers. What happens next, game theory speaking? You seem to be arguing in favor of exactly opposite of the that, wanting to funnel everyone into a single collective.

The problem with your reasoning is this:

You assume that the number of health insurers and the number of consumers is equal, and that they individually possess relatively equivalent bargaining power. That simply is untrue and can never be true.



If you wanted to maximize value to consumers, then you'd organize all consumers into a single collective that then bargains individually with each insurance company for plans in such a way that the people doing the bargaining on behalf of the consumers actually represent the consumers' interests. This is obviously an ideal that is not achievable. But it shows you the general direction of optimal strategies for consumers.

The problem with being too optimal for consumers, though, is that -- like labor unions -- they can get too good of a deal and drive the companies out of business. Then we are all screwed.

Nope. Who thinks that drivers and insurance companies are equal in number???? The imbalance doesn't mean their isn't competition amongst the providers.

So unions/ collective bargaining are good or no? You seem to be arguing on both sides of that equation.

[Speaker to Animals]

You don't have one competitor though unless it is artificially limited. Now game theory out multiple competitors on each side of the equation. Multiple heath insurers vs multiple vouchers. What happens next, game theory speaking? You seem to be arguing in favor of exactly opposite of the that, wanting to funnel everyone into a single collective.

The problem with your reasoning is this:

You assume that the number of health insurers and the number of consumers is equal, and that they individually possess relatively equivalent bargaining power. That simply is untrue and can never be true.



If you wanted to maximize value to consumers, then you'd organize all consumers into a single collective that then bargains individually with each insurance company for plans in such a way that the people doing the bargaining on behalf of the consumers actually represent the consumers' interests. This is obviously an ideal that is not achievable. But it shows you the general direction of optimal strategies for consumers.

The problem with being too optimal for consumers, though, is that -- like labor unions -- they can get too good of a deal and drive the companies out of business. Then we are all screwed.

Nope. Who thinks that drivers and insurance companies are equal in number???? The imbalance doesn't mean their isn't competition amongst the providers.

So unions/ collective bargaining are good or no? You seem to be arguing on both sides of that equation.

The drivers insurance market is a different game, though. It's true insurance, whereas "health insurance" is a misnomer, not actually being insurance at all.

Furthermore and even so, if you could somehow theoretically collectivize consumers in the driver's license market, then they'd for sure get better rates and deals.