Europe, Boring Until it's Not

[Speaker to Animals]

StA
Jordan Peterson's family has had a lot of problems with auto immune disease and depression. They changed their diet a lot and are almost cured. What we eat is really important for our well-being. I want to give it a go to see if it will help with my psoriasis but it's hard when you have two teenage kids set in their ways food wise. Anyway here is Mikhaila Peterson's blog about it.
http://mikhailapeterson.com

That's interesting. My experience has been that my diet has a huge impact on the pain. My goal should be to reduce inflammation. Nightshade plants are not great in large amounts, unfortunately. Alcohol is a no-no.

I really suspect the pain would be even further reduced by switching to a predominantly fish diet.

[Hanarchy Montanarchy]

"Humans are more than an animal because of unique moral attributes that put them into a moral sphere."

"Humans are both source and sensible object of moral obligation."

Okay, that's kind of like my argument, the one you called a tautology, you know when I essentially said self-valuing consciousness is both the source and sensible object of ethical value. And since we can dispense with the pretense to objectivity in talking about ethics...

Your basis for human value is no less tautological, and seems to be a differently worded version of my basis for sentience value. If you agree with laws coercing humans to respect humans because they're ethically valuable according to your tautology, then you can't be against laws that I propose for humans to respect sentience when it's using basically the exact same tautological proof. So what are you trying to pull here?

And I'm pretty sure I never said or implied that I was a consequentialist.

As for the last bit about empathy, if we were to agree empathy is important to virtue and morality the rest of the statement still doesn't follow, anymore than to say to say women are excluded from male ethics because men can never understand what it's like to be a woman.

The fact that humans are capable of comprehending and being concerned with morality puts them in the moral sphere. We only know this is true about humans. This is a descriptive statement, not a normative one.

We already agreed that any conscious being values itself, but it is not self-valuing that makes humans capable of comprehending morality, it is valuing something other than self, like virtue. This is one major difference in out arguments. One might even describe it as one of the main features and definitions of ethical behavior, and also descriptive rather than normative.

And I don't claim objectivity when I say that humans are the source and sensible object of moral obligation. I specifically make that as a claim about ethical deontology. I am arguing that this is a superior rule because it doesn't lead me into the moral absurdities that seem to attend valuing animals as much as humans, like forcibly sterilizing humans for their own good because I fail to recognize that human agency is sufficiently different from animal agency. I don't claim to know the basis for human value, I am claiming that moral rules are only relevant to humans because only humans can comprehend them.

When did I suggest laws coercing humans to respect humans because they're ethically valuable? We can talk about rules in moral deontology without talking about civics. The only time I mentioned using the law to coerce people is when Monte asked me about bear baiting, and I said I would be comfortable with democratically deciding what laws should apply to the industry. This a civic consideration, not an ethical one.

You implied you were a consequentialist when you asked me why ethics matter at all if I think motivations are more important than consequences, and when you justified forcibly sterilizing humans if the consequences of not doing so were sufficiently dire. And when you said you would suspend your moral condemnation of eating meat if it was deemed necessary for survival. Basically almost every moral argument you have made that isn't explicitly a tautology.

Early on I told you your argument looked like a tautology, and you agreed, and we moved on. If you think you can make an argument for parity being the objective source of morality that isn't a tautology, I would still be interested to hear it.

This: "women are excluded from male ethics because men can never understand what it's like to be a woman" is what some contemporary progressives argue, and, interestingly, what irredeemable chauvinists seem to believe, but I think it is absolutely ridiculous to claim that the difference between men and women is the same as that between men and beasts. As a man and a humanist, I am reasonably certain that women are still capable of moral comprehension, so my deontological claims still apply to them. But then, I don't have quite the low opinion of the fairer sex that is bandied about these parts... I am surprised to see you reduce woman to the status of animals, but I guess I should have expected it, you are a vegan, after all, with no special regard for humanity.

When defining the essence of something like ethics there's only so far in a chain of logic one can go before the terms become tautological.

So your ethics rests on the proposition that animals do not have the ability to understand moral obligation, and because of this there is no obligation for humans to treat them ethically, but you say humans can understand moral obligation and so there is obligation to treat them ethically. Okay. It would then stand to reason that a human without the cognitive ability to understand moral obligation would thus be on the same level as any animal that doesn't understand moral obligation, and any animal that demonstrates moral obligation would be on the level of a human.
Thankfully this is not society's standard for ethical value but I want to see how committed you are to this principle.

So if this isn't just a typical double standard argument, are you prepared to justify infanticide, or the murder of cognitively impaired humans, the severely retarded, or insane people, or psychopaths for nothing more than their apparent lack of understanding of moral obligation? Since your rule is partly a way to avoid your preconcluded "moral absurdities" that my rule supposedly creates, I'm curious as to your answer.

It becomes a civic a question when you and other people say that I'm imposing my beliefs on others in an immoral manner. This implies that I have some kind of legislative intent behind my arguments, which in fact I do, but to call any proposed law "forcing ones beliefs" on others is stupid. My point is the double standard hypocrisy, in that they will support legislation when they have a moral belief, such as the belief in human ethical value.
Are you saying you don't support laws against rape and murder, that even though you value humans as the only things worth having moral obligations for, you are against legislation which enforces those obligations? It would seem strange if you don't.

I don't have to come up with an argument for animals that doesn't at some point rest on a tautology until your argument for humans ceases to be one. Because until then, inasmuch as your argument that humans are valuable is true, my arguments that animals are valuable is also true, which has always been my point.

For your last point, it may be ridiculous to claim that men and women are as different from each other as beasts and men, but your claim that empathizing with animals is at best an imaginative leap and therefore animals don't need to be ethically considered is equally ridiculous, when all of empathy is a leap. Who are you to say I can put myself into an empathetic position of a stranger more than with my cat?

Again, my argument for morality between humans is descriptive, not normative. We, by all accounts, have a moral sense of obligation. If you believe in absolute parity, argue it, but don't shift the obligation of your normative claim on to my descriptive claim. If you want to abandon your moral sense of duties to humans if it can't be applied to animals, that is, as I argued, the problem with veganism.

And, again, you are asking my to justify not treating humans as animals on your assumption that intellect is somehow tied to morality. I don't think being severely retarded diminishes your humanity in a relevant way. My moral obligation to an infant is the same as my moral obligation to its parents. (If you want to claim you see all animals on earth the way a parent views their child, then you are simply a liar.) As far as psychopaths, they get the same treatment as everyone else, in that they are not punished for crimes they may commit. I think it is acceptable for us to exterminate psychopaths after they commit crimes.
You are arguing that parity is the source of morality, not me, so I don't have to prove the parity of human consciousness. Because I do not know what part of human consciousness is required for a moral sense, I don't know what you can remove from human experience to justify treating them like animals.

When I argue you are forcing your morality on others, I am referring to the fact that you were perfectly willing to justify threatening a human over the well being of a cow. No consideration for law required. You are proselytizing here, at least own it.

If you want to argue that you can make the imaginative leap of empathy to non human animals as easily as human animals, again, I think that is patently silly. You have human experiences that it is reasonable to assume track well with other human's experience. You have no reason to assume it tracks at all well with chicken experience, but you are free to make that claim, just don't pretend it is reasonable. For you to make it a rational claim, you have to make a rational argument for absolute parity of consciousness, because you have already acknowledged a deer mind and a human mind aren't the same, I assume you are unable to do this.

[JohnDonne]

The fact that humans are capable of comprehending and being concerned with morality puts them in the moral sphere. We only know this is true about humans. This is a descriptive statement, not a normative one.

We already agreed that any conscious being values itself, but it is not self-valuing that makes humans capable of comprehending morality, it is valuing something other than self, like virtue. This is one major difference in out arguments. One might even describe it as one of the main features and definitions of ethical behavior, and also descriptive rather than normative.

And I don't claim objectivity when I say that humans are the source and sensible object of moral obligation. I specifically make that as a claim about ethical deontology. I am arguing that this is a superior rule because it doesn't lead me into the moral absurdities that seem to attend valuing animals as much as humans, like forcibly sterilizing humans for their own good because I fail to recognize that human agency is sufficiently different from animal agency. I don't claim to know the basis for human value, I am claiming that moral rules are only relevant to humans because only humans can comprehend them.

When did I suggest laws coercing humans to respect humans because they're ethically valuable? We can talk about rules in moral deontology without talking about civics. The only time I mentioned using the law to coerce people is when Monte asked me about bear baiting, and I said I would be comfortable with democratically deciding what laws should apply to the industry. This a civic consideration, not an ethical one.

You implied you were a consequentialist when you asked me why ethics matter at all if I think motivations are more important than consequences, and when you justified forcibly sterilizing humans if the consequences of not doing so were sufficiently dire. And when you said you would suspend your moral condemnation of eating meat if it was deemed necessary for survival. Basically almost every moral argument you have made that isn't explicitly a tautology.

Early on I told you your argument looked like a tautology, and you agreed, and we moved on. If you think you can make an argument for parity being the objective source of morality that isn't a tautology, I would still be interested to hear it.

This: "women are excluded from male ethics because men can never understand what it's like to be a woman" is what some contemporary progressives argue, and, interestingly, what irredeemable chauvinists seem to believe, but I think it is absolutely ridiculous to claim that the difference between men and women is the same as that between men and beasts. As a man and a humanist, I am reasonably certain that women are still capable of moral comprehension, so my deontological claims still apply to them. But then, I don't have quite the low opinion of the fairer sex that is bandied about these parts... I am surprised to see you reduce woman to the status of animals, but I guess I should have expected it, you are a vegan, after all, with no special regard for humanity.

When defining the essence of something like ethics there's only so far in a chain of logic one can go before the terms become tautological.

So your ethics rests on the proposition that animals do not have the ability to understand moral obligation, and because of this there is no obligation for humans to treat them ethically, but you say humans can understand moral obligation and so there is obligation to treat them ethically. Okay. It would then stand to reason that a human without the cognitive ability to understand moral obligation would thus be on the same level as any animal that doesn't understand moral obligation, and any animal that demonstrates moral obligation would be on the level of a human.
Thankfully this is not society's standard for ethical value but I want to see how committed you are to this principle.

So if this isn't just a typical double standard argument, are you prepared to justify infanticide, or the murder of cognitively impaired humans, the severely retarded, or insane people, or psychopaths for nothing more than their apparent lack of understanding of moral obligation? Since your rule is partly a way to avoid your preconcluded "moral absurdities" that my rule supposedly creates, I'm curious as to your answer.

It becomes a civic a question when you and other people say that I'm imposing my beliefs on others in an immoral manner. This implies that I have some kind of legislative intent behind my arguments, which in fact I do, but to call any proposed law "forcing ones beliefs" on others is stupid. My point is the double standard hypocrisy, in that they will support legislation when they have a moral belief, such as the belief in human ethical value.
Are you saying you don't support laws against rape and murder, that even though you value humans as the only things worth having moral obligations for, you are against legislation which enforces those obligations? It would seem strange if you don't.

I don't have to come up with an argument for animals that doesn't at some point rest on a tautology until your argument for humans ceases to be one. Because until then, inasmuch as your argument that humans are valuable is true, my arguments that animals are valuable is also true, which has always been my point.

For your last point, it may be ridiculous to claim that men and women are as different from each other as beasts and men, but your claim that empathizing with animals is at best an imaginative leap and therefore animals don't need to be ethically considered is equally ridiculous, when all of empathy is a leap. Who are you to say I can put myself into an empathetic position of a stranger more than with my cat?

Again, my argument for morality between humans is descriptive, not normative. We, by all accounts, have a moral sense of obligation. If you believe in absolute parity, argue it, but don't shift the obligation of your normative claim on to my descriptive claim. If you want to abandon your moral sense of duties to humans if it can't be applied to animals, that is, as I argued, the problem with veganism.

And, again, you are asking my to justify not treating humans as animals on your assumption that intellect is somehow tied to morality. I don't think being severely retarded diminishes your humanity in a relevant way. My moral obligation to an infant is the same as my moral obligation to its parents. (If you want to claim you see all animals on earth the way a parent views their child, then you are simply a liar.) As far as psychopaths, they get the same treatment as everyone else, in that they are not punished for crimes they may commit. I think it is acceptable for us to exterminate psychopaths after they commit crimes.
You are arguing that parity is the source of morality, not me, so I don't have to prove the parity of human consciousness. Because I do not know what part of human consciousness is required for a moral sense, I don't know what you can remove from human experience to justify treating them like animals.

When I argue you are forcing your morality on others, I am referring to the fact that you were perfectly willing to justify threatening a human over the well being of a cow. No consideration for law required. You are proselytizing here, at least own it.

If you want to argue that you can make the imaginative leap of empathy to non human animals as easily as human animals, again, I think that is patently silly. You have human experiences that it is reasonable to assume track well with other human's experience. You have no reason to assume it tracks at all well with chicken experience, but you are free to make that claim, just don't pretend it is reasonable. For you to make it a rational claim, you have to make a rational argument for absolute parity of consciousness, because you have already acknowledged a deer mind and a human mind aren't the same, I assume you are unable to do this.

Ok, I think I see what you're saying. You are saying that it is the case that humans are the only known being that can understand moral obligation which puts them into a unique "moral sphere."

I'll entertain the idea. I'll refrain from citing evidence of animals acting out of morality and instead take your description at face value.

Here's my descriptive statement: Humans that comprehend moral obligation at times feel obligated towards other creatures and humans that cannot comprehend moral obligation. Moral obligation implies that there is an ethical value one is obligated towards. It follows that a creature need not comprehend moral obligation to have ethical value. And like you, I need no objective ethics or parity to come to this conclusion, it's all based in descriptive, observable ethics.

So one that would argue that we ought to exclude animals from ethical consideration because they supposedly cannot comprehend moral obligation is faced with a dilemma. Either be consistent and disregard humans that are lacking comprehension of ethical obligations, or admit that this is not the ethically relevant attribute, on a descriptive or normative level. (This places the burden of proof back on you because you are asserting that animals are not at all ethically valuable when it is descriptively not the case since humans act with obligation towards them and thus you were either wrong in your assertion or you were making a normative statement.)

Here's another descriptive statement: It is the case that human moral obligation as it manifests exists only in relation to sentience, whether it be human or as in the case with pets and other circumstance, with animals. Because humans descriptively demonstrate an equality of moral obligation to humans with minds as divergent in attributes as those of certain animals are different to humans, it follows that the divergence of those attributes are not morally relevant, thus I need not establish a mental equivalence in those irrelevant attributes to observe that they are equally in possession of the attribute that is descriptively of concern to human moral obligation, namely, sentience.

So it would follow in a descriptive way then that human moral obligation as it can be observed is concerned with sentience.

So that would place the burden of proof on you of why would it be ethical to violate moral obligations?

[Hanarchy Montanarchy]

When defining the essence of something like ethics there's only so far in a chain of logic one can go before the terms become tautological.

So your ethics rests on the proposition that animals do not have the ability to understand moral obligation, and because of this there is no obligation for humans to treat them ethically, but you say humans can understand moral obligation and so there is obligation to treat them ethically. Okay. It would then stand to reason that a human without the cognitive ability to understand moral obligation would thus be on the same level as any animal that doesn't understand moral obligation, and any animal that demonstrates moral obligation would be on the level of a human.
Thankfully this is not society's standard for ethical value but I want to see how committed you are to this principle.

So if this isn't just a typical double standard argument, are you prepared to justify infanticide, or the murder of cognitively impaired humans, the severely retarded, or insane people, or psychopaths for nothing more than their apparent lack of understanding of moral obligation? Since your rule is partly a way to avoid your preconcluded "moral absurdities" that my rule supposedly creates, I'm curious as to your answer.

It becomes a civic a question when you and other people say that I'm imposing my beliefs on others in an immoral manner. This implies that I have some kind of legislative intent behind my arguments, which in fact I do, but to call any proposed law "forcing ones beliefs" on others is stupid. My point is the double standard hypocrisy, in that they will support legislation when they have a moral belief, such as the belief in human ethical value.
Are you saying you don't support laws against rape and murder, that even though you value humans as the only things worth having moral obligations for, you are against legislation which enforces those obligations? It would seem strange if you don't.

I don't have to come up with an argument for animals that doesn't at some point rest on a tautology until your argument for humans ceases to be one. Because until then, inasmuch as your argument that humans are valuable is true, my arguments that animals are valuable is also true, which has always been my point.

For your last point, it may be ridiculous to claim that men and women are as different from each other as beasts and men, but your claim that empathizing with animals is at best an imaginative leap and therefore animals don't need to be ethically considered is equally ridiculous, when all of empathy is a leap. Who are you to say I can put myself into an empathetic position of a stranger more than with my cat?

Again, my argument for morality between humans is descriptive, not normative. We, by all accounts, have a moral sense of obligation. If you believe in absolute parity, argue it, but don't shift the obligation of your normative claim on to my descriptive claim. If you want to abandon your moral sense of duties to humans if it can't be applied to animals, that is, as I argued, the problem with veganism.

And, again, you are asking my to justify not treating humans as animals on your assumption that intellect is somehow tied to morality. I don't think being severely retarded diminishes your humanity in a relevant way. My moral obligation to an infant is the same as my moral obligation to its parents. (If you want to claim you see all animals on earth the way a parent views their child, then you are simply a liar.) As far as psychopaths, they get the same treatment as everyone else, in that they are not punished for crimes they may commit. I think it is acceptable for us to exterminate psychopaths after they commit crimes.
You are arguing that parity is the source of morality, not me, so I don't have to prove the parity of human consciousness. Because I do not know what part of human consciousness is required for a moral sense, I don't know what you can remove from human experience to justify treating them like animals.

When I argue you are forcing your morality on others, I am referring to the fact that you were perfectly willing to justify threatening a human over the well being of a cow. No consideration for law required. You are proselytizing here, at least own it.

If you want to argue that you can make the imaginative leap of empathy to non human animals as easily as human animals, again, I think that is patently silly. You have human experiences that it is reasonable to assume track well with other human's experience. You have no reason to assume it tracks at all well with chicken experience, but you are free to make that claim, just don't pretend it is reasonable. For you to make it a rational claim, you have to make a rational argument for absolute parity of consciousness, because you have already acknowledged a deer mind and a human mind aren't the same, I assume you are unable to do this.

Ok, I think I see what you're saying. You are saying that it is the case that humans are the only known being that can understand moral obligation which puts them into a unique "moral sphere."

I'll entertain the idea. I'll refrain from citing evidence of animals acting out of morality and instead take your description at face value.

Here's my descriptive statement: Humans that comprehend moral obligation at times feel obligated towards other creatures and humans that cannot comprehend moral obligation. Moral obligation implies that there is an ethical value one is obligated towards. It follows that a creature need not comprehend moral obligation to have ethical value. And like you, I need no objective ethics or parity to come to this conclusion, it's all based in descriptive, observable ethics.

So one that would argue that we ought to exclude animals from ethical consideration because they supposedly cannot comprehend moral obligation is faced with a dilemma. Either be consistent and disregard humans that are lacking comprehension of ethical obligations, or admit that this is not the ethically relevant attribute, on a descriptive or normative level. (This places the burden of proof back on you because you are asserting that animals are not at all ethically valuable when it is descriptively not the case since humans act with obligation towards them and thus you were either wrong in your assertion or you were making a normative statement.)

Here's another descriptive statement: It is the case that human moral obligation as it manifests exists only in relation to sentience, whether it be human or as in the case with pets and other circumstance, with animals. Because humans descriptively demonstrate an equality of moral obligation to humans with minds as divergent in attributes as those of certain animals are different to humans, it follows that the divergence of those attributes are not morally relevant, thus I need not establish a mental equivalence in those irrelevant attributes to observe that they are equally in possession of the attribute that is descriptively of concern to human moral obligation, namely, sentience.

So it would follow in a descriptive way then that human moral obligation as it can be observed is concerned with sentience.

So that would place the burden of proof on you of why would it be ethical to violate moral obligations?

People feel moral obligations towards inanimate objects like religious icons all the time. You don't accept their moral obligations as your own. The problem is the assumption that a moral obligation felt by anyone should be felt by everyone.
I know there are all sorts of observations of what appears like morality or altruism in animals. I find it all very unconvincing, but that isn't the point. The point is that we know what it is like to have a human conscience, any assumption that other animals have it is unfounded. But nothing really important hinges on this.

Here are the nuts and bolts:

Descriptive statement 1: Humans comprehend morality
Descriptive statement 2: Human minds are different than other animals'
Normative statement: Humans should be an ethical priority

I hypothesize that the first statement is one of the main explanation for the second, but my moral universe doesn't really change if this isn't the case.

I am not even arguing that our moral obligations towards humans are absolutely equivalent. For instance, my obligation to my family is different than my obligation to strangers. I think it is Singer who argues for absolute parity of moral obligations to humans... I believe he is also woefully misguided, for the same reasons I think veganism is misguided.

The morality of veganism is procrustean, and the result of this always seems to be corrosive to human empathy. By all means, continue to feel moral obligations to animals, just as some feel the need to kiss bow before icons. Obligations don't transfer. I don't need to ought my way out of any specific moral obligation to animals just because you are trying to ought me into one.

As a bit of an olive branch, I think you are right, and that our moral obligations to proven psychopaths are roughly equivalent to our moral obligations to animals. Kill them quickly and without cruelty or malice wherever possible. The only difference is we probably shouldn't et'em.

(Also, StA: Tried a baked salmon with a honey-soy glaze the other night with the old lady. You were right, it was easy as hell and off the charts delicious. Seafood is back on the menu; I am, forever, in your debt.)

[Hastur]

I wonder what the vegan plan for rats is. If we stop killing them because of feels they will catch on in no time. I can just see the fun as they get bolder and start slinking into restaurant kitchens and supermarkets in broad daylight. They like to eat everything we do so they will compete for every scrap with every trick they can up with.

[SuburbanFarmer]

I wonder what the vegan plan for rats is. If we stop killing them because of feels they will catch on in no time. I can just see the fun as they get bolder and start slinking into restaurant kitchens and supermarkets in broad daylight. They like to eat everything we do so they will compete for every scrap with every trick they can up with.

THEY HAVE A RIGHT TO EAT TOO!!!

[BjornP]

I wonder what the vegan plan for rats is. If we stop killing them because of feels they will catch on in no time. I can just see the fun as they get bolder and start slinking into restaurant kitchens and supermarkets in broad daylight. They like to eat everything we do so they will compete for every scrap with every trick they can up with.

I'm fairly certain they'll be opening five star restaurants.

[JohnDonne]

Again, my argument for morality between humans is descriptive, not normative. We, by all accounts, have a moral sense of obligation. If you believe in absolute parity, argue it, but don't shift the obligation of your normative claim on to my descriptive claim. If you want to abandon your moral sense of duties to humans if it can't be applied to animals, that is, as I argued, the problem with veganism.

And, again, you are asking my to justify not treating humans as animals on your assumption that intellect is somehow tied to morality. I don't think being severely retarded diminishes your humanity in a relevant way. My moral obligation to an infant is the same as my moral obligation to its parents. (If you want to claim you see all animals on earth the way a parent views their child, then you are simply a liar.) As far as psychopaths, they get the same treatment as everyone else, in that they are not punished for crimes they may commit. I think it is acceptable for us to exterminate psychopaths after they commit crimes.
You are arguing that parity is the source of morality, not me, so I don't have to prove the parity of human consciousness. Because I do not know what part of human consciousness is required for a moral sense, I don't know what you can remove from human experience to justify treating them like animals.

When I argue you are forcing your morality on others, I am referring to the fact that you were perfectly willing to justify threatening a human over the well being of a cow. No consideration for law required. You are proselytizing here, at least own it.

If you want to argue that you can make the imaginative leap of empathy to non human animals as easily as human animals, again, I think that is patently silly. You have human experiences that it is reasonable to assume track well with other human's experience. You have no reason to assume it tracks at all well with chicken experience, but you are free to make that claim, just don't pretend it is reasonable. For you to make it a rational claim, you have to make a rational argument for absolute parity of consciousness, because you have already acknowledged a deer mind and a human mind aren't the same, I assume you are unable to do this.

Ok, I think I see what you're saying. You are saying that it is the case that humans are the only known being that can understand moral obligation which puts them into a unique "moral sphere."

I'll entertain the idea. I'll refrain from citing evidence of animals acting out of morality and instead take your description at face value.

Here's my descriptive statement: Humans that comprehend moral obligation at times feel obligated towards other creatures and humans that cannot comprehend moral obligation. Moral obligation implies that there is an ethical value one is obligated towards. It follows that a creature need not comprehend moral obligation to have ethical value. And like you, I need no objective ethics or parity to come to this conclusion, it's all based in descriptive, observable ethics.

So one that would argue that we ought to exclude animals from ethical consideration because they supposedly cannot comprehend moral obligation is faced with a dilemma. Either be consistent and disregard humans that are lacking comprehension of ethical obligations, or admit that this is not the ethically relevant attribute, on a descriptive or normative level. (This places the burden of proof back on you because you are asserting that animals are not at all ethically valuable when it is descriptively not the case since humans act with obligation towards them and thus you were either wrong in your assertion or you were making a normative statement.)

Here's another descriptive statement: It is the case that human moral obligation as it manifests exists only in relation to sentience, whether it be human or as in the case with pets and other circumstance, with animals. Because humans descriptively demonstrate an equality of moral obligation to humans with minds as divergent in attributes as those of certain animals are different to humans, it follows that the divergence of those attributes are not morally relevant, thus I need not establish a mental equivalence in those irrelevant attributes to observe that they are equally in possession of the attribute that is descriptively of concern to human moral obligation, namely, sentience.

So it would follow in a descriptive way then that human moral obligation as it can be observed is concerned with sentience.

So that would place the burden of proof on you of why would it be ethical to violate moral obligations?

People feel moral obligations towards inanimate objects like religious icons all the time. You don't accept their moral obligations as your own. The problem is the assumption that a moral obligation felt by anyone should be felt by everyone.
I know there are all sorts of observations of what appears like morality or altruism in animals. I find it all very unconvincing, but that isn't the point. The point is that we know what it is like to have a human conscience, any assumption that other animals have it is unfounded. But nothing really important hinges on this.

Here are the nuts and bolts:

Descriptive statement 1: Humans comprehend morality
Descriptive statement 2: Human minds are different than other animals'
Normative statement: Humans should be an ethical priority

I hypothesize that the first statement is one of the main explanation for the second, but my moral universe doesn't really change if this isn't the case.

I am not even arguing that our moral obligations towards humans are absolutely equivalent. For instance, my obligation to my family is different than my obligation to strangers. I think it is Singer who argues for absolute parity of moral obligations to humans... I believe he is also woefully misguided, for the same reasons I think veganism is misguided.

The morality of veganism is procrustean, and the result of this always seems to be corrosive to human empathy. By all means, continue to feel moral obligations to animals, just as some feel the need to kiss bow before icons. Obligations don't transfer. I don't need to ought my way out of any specific moral obligation to animals just because you are trying to ought me into one.

As a bit of an olive branch, I think you are right, and that our moral obligations to proven psychopaths are roughly equivalent to our moral obligations to animals. Kill them quickly and without cruelty or malice wherever possible. The only difference is we probably shouldn't et'em.

(Also, StA: Tried a baked salmon with a honey-soy glaze the other night with the old lady. You were right, it was easy as hell and off the charts delicious. Seafood is back on the menu; I am, forever, in your debt.)

The issue with your formula is that it appeals to an exception without naming the distinction, so it is valid inasmuch as this is valid:

Descriptive statement 1: Only some humans comprehend morality
Descriptive statement 2: Those human minds are different than other humans
Normative statement: Those humans should be an ethical priority

So again, you would have to bite the bullet on allowing infants and other humans to not be moral obligations. Or you have to name the distinction, or else you're just appealing to a fallacy. If you were to try to make the social contract argument for the sake of babies and other people, you'd have to accept the atrocities done in the name of the social contract.

I respond to your point about humans worshiping idols in this way:
Humans that appear to be worshiping icons are demonstrating moral obligation to sentient deities, not the objects themselves. (It's not relevant to my point about obligation and sentience whether the deity exists or not since the worshipers believe it exists.)

Now, to your point that obligations don't transfer. Sometimes they do, sometimes they don't, it depends.

I would say I'm not arguing to transfer moral obligations, I am more observing existing ones and arguing to apply them consistently.

I am arguing that it is the case that the commonality in moral obligation is that sentience has ethical value.

A is ethically valuable because it has X
B has X
Then it follows that B is ethically valuable.

I am not arguing for absolute parity, I am aware that circumstance dictates obligation, I am merely noting the relevant attribute equivalence, which implies parity. If you would argue against the implied parity then the burden of proof is on you either show that the attribute I name is not relevant, or make a relevant distinction and bite the bullet for the humans that the distinction doesn't apply for.

[Speaker to Animals]

Well, it's Friday. I am trying to choose which of John Donne's salmon friends I am going to consume today.

As I throw them onto the baking sheet, I imagine them saying things like, oh no, don't let that bad man eat us! Save us, John Donne! But he's helpless due to the fact that he would have to manually pump a dangerous, explosive chemical into his vehicle in order to get here and save them from the oven.

[Hanarchy Montanarchy]

Ok, I think I see what you're saying. You are saying that it is the case that humans are the only known being that can understand moral obligation which puts them into a unique "moral sphere."

I'll entertain the idea. I'll refrain from citing evidence of animals acting out of morality and instead take your description at face value.

Here's my descriptive statement: Humans that comprehend moral obligation at times feel obligated towards other creatures and humans that cannot comprehend moral obligation. Moral obligation implies that there is an ethical value one is obligated towards. It follows that a creature need not comprehend moral obligation to have ethical value. And like you, I need no objective ethics or parity to come to this conclusion, it's all based in descriptive, observable ethics.

So one that would argue that we ought to exclude animals from ethical consideration because they supposedly cannot comprehend moral obligation is faced with a dilemma. Either be consistent and disregard humans that are lacking comprehension of ethical obligations, or admit that this is not the ethically relevant attribute, on a descriptive or normative level. (This places the burden of proof back on you because you are asserting that animals are not at all ethically valuable when it is descriptively not the case since humans act with obligation towards them and thus you were either wrong in your assertion or you were making a normative statement.)

Here's another descriptive statement: It is the case that human moral obligation as it manifests exists only in relation to sentience, whether it be human or as in the case with pets and other circumstance, with animals. Because humans descriptively demonstrate an equality of moral obligation to humans with minds as divergent in attributes as those of certain animals are different to humans, it follows that the divergence of those attributes are not morally relevant, thus I need not establish a mental equivalence in those irrelevant attributes to observe that they are equally in possession of the attribute that is descriptively of concern to human moral obligation, namely, sentience.

So it would follow in a descriptive way then that human moral obligation as it can be observed is concerned with sentience.

So that would place the burden of proof on you of why would it be ethical to violate moral obligations?

People feel moral obligations towards inanimate objects like religious icons all the time. You don't accept their moral obligations as your own. The problem is the assumption that a moral obligation felt by anyone should be felt by everyone.
I know there are all sorts of observations of what appears like morality or altruism in animals. I find it all very unconvincing, but that isn't the point. The point is that we know what it is like to have a human conscience, any assumption that other animals have it is unfounded. But nothing really important hinges on this.

Here are the nuts and bolts:

Descriptive statement 1: Humans comprehend morality
Descriptive statement 2: Human minds are different than other animals'
Normative statement: Humans should be an ethical priority

I hypothesize that the first statement is one of the main explanation for the second, but my moral universe doesn't really change if this isn't the case.

I am not even arguing that our moral obligations towards humans are absolutely equivalent. For instance, my obligation to my family is different than my obligation to strangers. I think it is Singer who argues for absolute parity of moral obligations to humans... I believe he is also woefully misguided, for the same reasons I think veganism is misguided.

The morality of veganism is procrustean, and the result of this always seems to be corrosive to human empathy. By all means, continue to feel moral obligations to animals, just as some feel the need to kiss bow before icons. Obligations don't transfer. I don't need to ought my way out of any specific moral obligation to animals just because you are trying to ought me into one.

As a bit of an olive branch, I think you are right, and that our moral obligations to proven psychopaths are roughly equivalent to our moral obligations to animals. Kill them quickly and without cruelty or malice wherever possible. The only difference is we probably shouldn't et'em.

(Also, StA: Tried a baked salmon with a honey-soy glaze the other night with the old lady. You were right, it was easy as hell and off the charts delicious. Seafood is back on the menu; I am, forever, in your debt.)

The issue with your formula is that it appeals to an exception without naming the distinction, so it is valid inasmuch as this is valid:

Descriptive statement 1: Only some humans comprehend morality
Descriptive statement 2: Those human minds are different than other humans
Normative statement: Those humans should be an ethical priority

So again, you would have to bite the bullet on allowing infants and other humans to not be moral obligations. Or you have to name the distinction, or else you're just appealing to a fallacy. If you were to try to make the social contract argument for the sake of babies and other people, you'd have to accept the atrocities done in the name of the social contract.

I respond to your point about humans worshiping idols in this way:
Humans that appear to be worshiping icons are demonstrating moral obligation to sentient deities, not the objects themselves. (It's not relevant to my point about obligation and sentience whether the deity exists or not since the worshipers believe it exists.)

Now, to your point that obligations don't transfer. Sometimes they do, sometimes they don't, it depends.

I would say I'm not arguing to transfer moral obligations, I am more observing existing ones and arguing to apply them consistently.

I am arguing that it is the case that the commonality in moral obligation is that sentience has ethical value.

A is ethically valuable because it has X
B has X
Then it follows that B is ethically valuable.

I am not arguing for absolute parity, I am aware that circumstance dictates obligation, I am merely noting the relevant attribute equivalence, which implies parity. If you would argue against the implied parity then the burden of proof is on you either show that the attribute I name is not relevant, or make a relevant distinction and bite the bullet for the humans that the distinction doesn't apply for.

It isn't a fallacy, it is an assumption that a human mind comprehends morality until proven otherwise, as in the case of psychopaths. I think it is a safe assumption. A solipsist would disagree, and then we can have a discussion about the theory of mind, but that is more metaphysics or epistemology.

If you do not want to accept that assumption, carry on with treating some humans like animals. That is on you.

Infants are human. I don't know when the moral component of human consciousness comes on line, but I assume it is sometime between when the child is conceived and they turn about 25, when their frontal lobe finishes developing. If you want to reduce humans of a certain age to animals, that is on you.

Again, your obsession with procrustean application of an ethical principle only results in you looking for excuses to dehumanize a portion of the human population to justify your dietary choices in pursuit of moral purity. It is an own goal at best, and downright unethical at worst.

(The statements I made weren't meant to be taken as a syllogism. It might have seemed that way since there were three of them. I was just trying to reduce the maxims I am operating from for concision. You can disagree with any of those maxims, but they aren't supposed to be a formula taken together.)