Europe, Boring Until it's Not

[JohnDonne]

I agree with that 100%.

Makes sense, I always make sure my potatoes are treated humanely right up until I boil them, you know, for my own psychological well-being.

Not far off, if you ask me. The only problem is I think we can be sure potatoes wouldn't be capable of experiencing cruelty.

Interestingly though, the term 'humanely' tells more about our ethical obligations than expected.

I think the idea that torturing other subjective consciousnesses is bad only in that it might adversely effect the consciousness doing the torturing is probably incoherent.

[JohnDonne]

Sentience ≠ Consciousness

I'm sure that it's not a distinction without a difference in this case and that you have some reason for trying to derail the argument into semantics.

[Hanarchy Montanarchy]

Something can only be valuable in relation to a subjective consciousness. I contend a consciousness values its life as much as another. You claim otherwise, you claim to know that human lives are more valuable either by that or some other criteria. Defend your assertion.

I wouldn't suggest that animals don't value their lives. I am just not certain if I am morally obligated to value their lives as much as they do, or even as much as I value my own health or happiness.
Nor do I think human lives are, abstractly, 'more valuable.' There are, however, many, many, ways that humans are superior, and those ways might be ethically relevant. For instance, if I value the ability to do long division, I am going to value the stupidest human higher than the smartest chicken, and I would think it was pretty unethical to deprive that human of a cheep source of nutrition.

We've established that human lives are not abstractly, "More valuable." I think that takes care of your initial argument.

As for your arbitrary standards of superiority being ethically relevant I'm not seeing it. We all have arbitrary standards of superiority, yet I recognize that I don't have the right to kill you if you are inferior at an arbitrary quality that I happen to value.

I initially argued that humans are superior, and superior in ways that might be ethically relevant.

And we aren't killing the chicken because it is bad at long division. We are killing the chicken to provide nutrients. And there are certainly times when you could make an ethically defensible case for killing me to defend something you value, for instance, your own life. (I don't mean that to sound like threatening internet tough-talk, if it came off that way... it is just an example of something you could arbitrarily value enough to justify killing me.)

[Hanarchy Montanarchy]

Makes sense, I always make sure my potatoes are treated humanely right up until I boil them, you know, for my own psychological well-being.

Not far off, if you ask me. The only problem is I think we can be sure potatoes wouldn't be capable of experiencing cruelty.

Interestingly though, the term 'humanely' tells more about our ethical obligations than expected.

I think the idea that torturing other subjective consciousnesses is bad only in that it might adversely effect the consciousness doing the torturing is probably incoherent.

Not only. But since we all seem to agree that the only being in the universe that you can be absolutely certain is actually conscious is yourself, I think the morally deleterious effects of pointless cruelty on that consciousness are relevant.
It is a virtue ethics argument, not a consequentialist one, so people often find it incoherent.

[JohnDonne]

I wouldn't suggest that animals don't value their lives. I am just not certain if I am morally obligated to value their lives as much as they do, or even as much as I value my own health or happiness.
Nor do I think human lives are, abstractly, 'more valuable.' There are, however, many, many, ways that humans are superior, and those ways might be ethically relevant. For instance, if I value the ability to do long division, I am going to value the stupidest human higher than the smartest chicken, and I would think it was pretty unethical to deprive that human of a cheep source of nutrition.

We've established that human lives are not abstractly, "More valuable." I think that takes care of your initial argument.

As for your arbitrary standards of superiority being ethically relevant I'm not seeing it. We all have arbitrary standards of superiority, yet I recognize that I don't have the right to kill you if you are inferior at an arbitrary quality that I happen to value.

I initially argued that humans are superior, and superior in ways that might be ethically relevant.

And we aren't killing the chicken because it is bad at long division. We are killing the chicken to provide nutrients. And there are certainly times when you could make an ethically defensible case for killing me to defend something you value, for instance, your own life. (I don't mean that to sound like threatening internet tough-talk, if it came off that way... it is just an example of something you could arbitrarily value enough to justify killing me.)

Killing the chicken for nutrients and the chicken being bad at long division are two unrelated things, except that you arbitrarily used the chicken's poor long division as the justification for killing the chicken to get what you wanted. It was a rationalization. Again, in human societal terms, I may decide that you are inferior and not valuable because your fingers are stubby, I may also want your money, but I am not permitted to kill you for your money and use the fact that your fingers are stubby as my justification, because it is an arbitrary one.

It's interesting that you used my "life" as the "arbitrary" value I could cite for killing you while defending myself, because that subjective consciousness is actually the one value that isn't arbitrary.

[JohnDonne]

Not far off, if you ask me. The only problem is I think we can be sure potatoes wouldn't be capable of experiencing cruelty.

Interestingly though, the term 'humanely' tells more about our ethical obligations than expected.

I think the idea that torturing other subjective consciousnesses is bad only in that it might adversely effect the consciousness doing the torturing is probably incoherent.

Not only. But since we all seem to agree that the only being in the universe that you can be absolutely certain is actually conscious is yourself, I think the morally deleterious effects of pointless cruelty on that consciousness are relevant.
It is a virtue ethics argument, not a consequentialist one, so people often find it incoherent.

Yes I agree that the effects of cruelty on the consciousness of the one being cruel is morally relevant, I am glad you agree it is not the only relevant thing.

[Hanarchy Montanarchy]

We've established that human lives are not abstractly, "More valuable." I think that takes care of your initial argument.

As for your arbitrary standards of superiority being ethically relevant I'm not seeing it. We all have arbitrary standards of superiority, yet I recognize that I don't have the right to kill you if you are inferior at an arbitrary quality that I happen to value.

I initially argued that humans are superior, and superior in ways that might be ethically relevant.

And we aren't killing the chicken because it is bad at long division. We are killing the chicken to provide nutrients. And there are certainly times when you could make an ethically defensible case for killing me to defend something you value, for instance, your own life. (I don't mean that to sound like threatening internet tough-talk, if it came off that way... it is just an example of something you could arbitrarily value enough to justify killing me.)

Killing the chicken for nutrients and the chicken being bad at long division are two unrelated things, except that you arbitrarily used the chicken's poor long division as the justification for killing the chicken to get what you wanted. It was a rationalization. Again, in human societal terms, I may decide that you are inferior and not valuable because your fingers are stubby, I may also want your money, but I am not permitted to kill you for your money and use the fact that your fingers are stubby as my justification, because it is an arbitrary one.

It's interesting that you used my "life" as the "arbitrary" value I could cite for killing you while defending myself, because that subjective consciousness is actually the one value that isn't arbitrary.

It is arbitrary in the sense that you value it a great deal more than I do, as I value my life a great deal more than you do (probably... I don't know you, you might be pathologically empathetic or something).

And I agree, the chicken's bad long division and its nutritional value aren't related. You brought up the idea of killing something for failing to live up to my arbitrary values. I was suggesting harvesting the chicken's nutrients in the pursuit of something I value more than the chicken's life, and suggesting that was morally defensible behavior.

[Hanarchy Montanarchy]

I think the idea that torturing other subjective consciousnesses is bad only in that it might adversely effect the consciousness doing the torturing is probably incoherent.

Not only. But since we all seem to agree that the only being in the universe that you can be absolutely certain is actually conscious is yourself, I think the morally deleterious effects of pointless cruelty on that consciousness are relevant.
It is a virtue ethics argument, not a consequentialist one, so people often find it incoherent.

Yes I agree that the effects of cruelty on the consciousness of the one being cruel is morally relevant, I am glad you agree it is not the only relevant thing.

Knocking these out of the part, I'll have you eating cheese and you'll have me feeling a little guilty for eating a steak in no time flat.

[JohnDonne]

I initially argued that humans are superior, and superior in ways that might be ethically relevant.

And we aren't killing the chicken because it is bad at long division. We are killing the chicken to provide nutrients. And there are certainly times when you could make an ethically defensible case for killing me to defend something you value, for instance, your own life. (I don't mean that to sound like threatening internet tough-talk, if it came off that way... it is just an example of something you could arbitrarily value enough to justify killing me.)

Killing the chicken for nutrients and the chicken being bad at long division are two unrelated things, except that you arbitrarily used the chicken's poor long division as the justification for killing the chicken to get what you wanted. It was a rationalization. Again, in human societal terms, I may decide that you are inferior and not valuable because your fingers are stubby, I may also want your money, but I am not permitted to kill you for your money and use the fact that your fingers are stubby as my justification, because it is an arbitrary one.

It's interesting that you used my "life" as the "arbitrary" value I could cite for killing you while defending myself, because that subjective consciousness is actually the one value that isn't arbitrary.

It is arbitrary in the sense that you value it a great deal more than I do, as I value my life a great deal more than you do (probably... I don't know you, you might be pathologically empathetic or something).

And I agree, the chicken's bad long division and its nutritional value aren't related. You brought up the idea of killing something for failing to live up to my arbitrary values. I was suggesting harvesting the chicken's nutrients in the pursuit of something I value more than the chicken's life, and suggesting that was morally defensible behavior.

For some reason my brain got stuck on this one. Anyway, I would say the life being threatened example is not arbitrary because a conscious life is the only source of the concept of value at all, it creates value and it values itself, therefore it is an intrinsic value, whereas something like a diamond is valuable only in relation to other intrinsic values. If you are trying to take away my intrinsic value for an extrinsic value, like my pocket change, or destroying a chicken's intrinsically valuable consciousness for the extrinsic value of cheap protein then that is an uneven bargain and not justifiable.

I will give you this: It is defensible for you to kill the chicken because you value its protein more than its life in precisely the manner that it is defensible for me to kill you for the loose change in your pocket because I value that loose change more than your life. That is, not very.

[Hanarchy Montanarchy]

Killing the chicken for nutrients and the chicken being bad at long division are two unrelated things, except that you arbitrarily used the chicken's poor long division as the justification for killing the chicken to get what you wanted. It was a rationalization. Again, in human societal terms, I may decide that you are inferior and not valuable because your fingers are stubby, I may also want your money, but I am not permitted to kill you for your money and use the fact that your fingers are stubby as my justification, because it is an arbitrary one.

It's interesting that you used my "life" as the "arbitrary" value I could cite for killing you while defending myself, because that subjective consciousness is actually the one value that isn't arbitrary.

It is arbitrary in the sense that you value it a great deal more than I do, as I value my life a great deal more than you do (probably... I don't know you, you might be pathologically empathetic or something).

And I agree, the chicken's bad long division and its nutritional value aren't related. You brought up the idea of killing something for failing to live up to my arbitrary values. I was suggesting harvesting the chicken's nutrients in the pursuit of something I value more than the chicken's life, and suggesting that was morally defensible behavior.

For some reason my brain got stuck on this one. Anyway, I would say the life being threatened example is not arbitrary because a conscious life is the only source of the concept of value at all, it creates value and it values itself, therefore it is an intrinsic value, whereas something like a diamond is valuable only in relation to other intrinsic values. If you are trying to take away my intrinsic value for an extrinsic value, like my pocket change, or destroying a chicken's intrinsically valuable consciousness for the extrinsic value of cheap protein then that is an uneven bargain and not justifiable.

I will give you this: It is defensible for you to kill the chicken because you value its protein more than its life in precisely the manner that it is defensible for me to kill you for the loose change in your pocket because I value that loose change more than your life. That is, not very.

Since we are dealing with the moral universe of subjective experience, I think it is safe to say that your life is only intrinsically valuable to you. To me, it is merely another extrinsic value.

So the real question is, is it actually morally accurate to suggest that a human omnivore in pursuit of animal protein is equivalent to avarice.

For example, if you are starving, is killing me for my pocket change in order to buy vegetables morally equivalent to killing a chicken directly for it's delicious protein? I really don't think it is, because I think I can make a case that humans are superior in morally relevant ways. I would even suggest that a human is so superior, that it is more immoral for you to steal from me without harming me, than it is to kill and eat a chicken.