1st Amendment Thread

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Re: 1st Amendment Thread

Post by de officiis » Sat Dec 03, 2016 7:28 am

After McCutcheon

The decision will likely help the political parties regain some power

Commentary by Jonathan S. Berkon & Marc E. Elias
In McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission,1 the Supreme Court struck down the “biennial aggregate limit” — a federal law limiting the total amount of money that an individual may contribute to federal candidates, party committees, and political action committees (“PACs”) in each two-year period. The per-candidate and per-committee limits (known as the “base limits”) remain in place, so the practical effect of McCutcheon is that individuals may now contribute the maximum amount to as many federal candidates, parties, and PACs as they please.

...

This dispute has real-world consequences. Under the plurality’s view, the government may only regulate against the threat of actual or apparent quid pro quo corruption.4 Under the dissent’s view, the government may also regulate against the corrosive effect of wealthy donors obtaining access to and influence over lawmakers — which means that it may regulate far more activity.5 Critics of the plurality view lament that it will further empower wealthy individuals and large corporations at the expense of average Americans. There is some truth to that contention. But under the current system, where contributions to political parties are strictly limited but contributions to so-called “Super PACs” are not, wealthy individuals and large corporations already enjoy an outsized role. Accordingly, McCutcheon and subsequent developments in the law are unlikely to affect who is financing our campaigns as much as they determine who is being financed to wage those campaigns. And the big winner is likely to be the group that suffers most under today’s regime: political parties.
Full Article: http://harvardlawreview.org/2014/06/after-mccutcheon/
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Re: 1st Amendment Thread

Post by de officiis » Sat Dec 03, 2016 7:28 am

NEW YORK PROGRESS AND PROTECTION PAC v. WALSH, 13 Civ. 6769 (PAC), UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, April 24, 2014, Filed

OPINION & ORDER

HONORABLE PAUL A. CROTTY, United States District Judge:
In democracies, there have to be campaigns for office—and you cannot campaign without money. "Unless only the rich are to run, the money must be raised." John T. Noonan, Jr., Bribes 621 (1984). There are choices in how the money is raised. New York City is a leader in public financing of campaigns; but it has not been without its problems. If money is to be raised, it has to come from supporters—or people who agree with the candidate. It is possible that money is given due to family relationships or friendships, or by public spirited souls who believe that campaigns are good and therefore should be supported. But those few instances aside, money is normally contributed in the hope—indeed the expectation—that the contribution will affect the candidate's votes or actions. That expectancy creates an implied promise to be fulfilled by the candidate once in office.

Consider some examples. First, there is the donor who gives to the candidate because the candidate is a war hero, who is bright, personable, and just the right person given the political climate and the political situation. The donor does not know the candidate, is affiliated with a different party, works in an unregulated industry, and does no business with the entity holding the election. Contrast that with a donor who wants access—perhaps an appointment to a special committee, or an overnight stay at the executive mansion. Or there is the donor who gives to the candidate because he expects the candidate to vote in a particular way on a particular issue.

When does the act of contributing to a candidate become an attempt at "corrupt" influence? And whenever and however can that line be drawn? One thing is certain: large political donations do not inspire confidence that the government in a representative democracy will do the right thing. As Justice Breyer noted in his dissenting opinion in McCutcheon v. FEC, "Corruption breaks the constitutionally necessary 'chain of communication' between the people and their representatives. . . . Where enough money calls the tune, the general public will not be heard." 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1467, 188 L. Ed. 2d 468 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting). In other words, he who pays the piper calls the tune.

Indeed, today's reality is that the voices of "we the people" are too often drowned out by the few who have great resources. And when the fundraising cycle slows (it never stops), lobbyists take over in a continuing attempt to gain influence over and access to elected officials. This is not a left or right, liberal or conservative analysis, but all the points on the political spectrum are increasingly involved in shaping this country's political agenda. In today's never-ending cycle of campaigning and lobbying; lobbying and campaigning, elected officials know where their money is coming from and that it must keep coming if they are to stay in office. Ordinary citizens recognize this; they know what is going on; they know they are not being included. It breeds cynicism and distrust.

Yet this is not to say that all influence that people seek is corrupt. There is a "difference between influence resting upon public opinion and influence bought by money alone." McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1481 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Influence resting upon public opinion is a vital aspect of our representative democracy. On the other hand, influence bought by money is no different than a bribe, and as the Book of Exodus 23:8 counsels, "a bribe blinds the clear-sighted and is the ruin of the just man's cause." But without knowing what is in a politician's or donor's mind, it is almost impossible to know where to draw the line. Legislators are well acquainted with these dangers. Based on their experiences, legislators have drawn the line by crafting contribution limitations like those contained in New York Election Laws §§ 14-114(8) and 14-126.

Our Supreme Court has made clear that only certain contribution limits comport with the First Amendment. Since contributing money is a form of speech, preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance is the only governmental interest strong enough to justify restrictions on political speech. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357-61, 130 S. Ct. 876, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753 (2010). More recently in McCutcheon, the Court concluded that "the possibility that an individual who spends large sums may garner influence over or access to elected officials or political parties . . . does not give rise to such quid pro quo corruption." Id. at 1438. In effect, it is only direct bribery—not influence—that the Court views as crossing the line into quid pro quo corruption. The Court agrees with Justice Breyer. He said that, "[t]his critically important definition of 'corruption' is inconsistent with the Court's prior case law." McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1466 (Breyer, J., dissenting). But this Court is bound to apply this definition "no matter how misguided . . . [the Court] may think it to be." Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375, 102 S. Ct. 703, 70 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1982).

Here, the Defendants claim that unlimited contributions to independent expenditure-only PACs create the risk of corruption. According to Defendants, "many political committees are so closely affiliated with candidates—including being operated by the candidate's close friends, former employees, and other allies—that they function in effect as extensions of candidates' own operations." See Letter from Brian A. Sutherland to the Hon. Paul A. Crotty April 22, 2014, ECF No. 67, at 2. In support, Defendants identify a number of personal and professional relationships between individuals at Jamestown Associates, the political consulting firm that produced NYPPP's campaign ads, and individuals associated with Mr. Lhota, the 2013 Republican candidate for New York City mayor. State Defendants' Rule 56.1 Statement, ECF No. 54, ¶¶ 6-7. But these tenuous connections hardly rise to the level of coordination—and certainly not to the level of quid pro quo corruption articulated by Citizens United and McCutcheon.1 In fact, such relationships are inherent in politics and in any political campaign. As a result, Defendants fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether NYPPP is truly an independent PAC.
Full Opinion: http://www.scribd.com/doc/220288072/NY- ... -and-Order

Oct. 2013 Opinion of 2nd Circuit: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-2nd-circuit/1647347.html:
New York Progress and Protection PAC (“NYPPP”), an “unauthorized political committee” formed to advocate in favor of candidates in New York elections, brought suit against election officials in the State and City of New York, as well as the Board of Elections, to enjoin enforcement of New York State Election Law §§ 14–114(8) and 14–126(2). Section 14–114(8) imposes a $150,000 aggregate annual limit on certain political contributions by any person in New York State. Section 14–126(2) makes it a misdemeanor to fail to file required statements or to knowingly and willfully violate any other provision of the Election Law. The effect of these provisions is to prevent NYPPP from receiving more than $150,000 from any individual contributor in any calendar year. NYPPP is a political committee that engages solely in independent expenditures, that is, expenditures made without prearrangement or coordination with a candidate. NYPPP, which has a donor waiting to contribute $200,000 to its cause, alleges that, as applied to NYPPP, the cap violates its core First Amendment right to advocate in favor of Joseph Lhota in the upcoming New York mayoral election, and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief.

The New York City mayoral Republican primary was held September 10, 2013. NYPPP filed suit two weeks later, on September 25, 2013, and the following day made a motion for a preliminary injunction. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Crotty, J.) ordered briefing and set oral argument for Tuesday, October 8. On Friday, October 11, NYPPP filed a letter reiterating the urgency of the matter in light of the approaching November 5 mayoral election. On October 16, NYPPP filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with this Court to compel the district court to rule on the pending motion. Soon after argument on the mandamus petition was scheduled for Friday, October 18, the district court issued an opinion and order denying NYPPP's motion. N.Y. Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, No. 13–cv–6769 (PAC), 2013 WL 5647168 (S.D.N .Y. Oct. 17, 2013) (“Op. & Order”). In quick succession, NYPPP withdrew its mandamus petition and appealed from the district court's order, and we agreed to hear argument as originally scheduled.

The appeal was heard on the merits at oral argument on October 18.

... the order denying the preliminary injunction is reversed, and the district court shall forthwith enter a preliminary injunction enjoining the application and enforcement of N.Y. Elec. Law §§ 14–114(8) and 14–126 against NYPPP and its individual donors for the use of the contributions of those donors only for independent expenditures. The mandate shall issue immediately.
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Re: 1st Amendment Thread

Post by de officiis » Sat Dec 03, 2016 7:30 am

WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE, INC., and WISCONSIN RIGHT TO LIFE STATE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE v. BARLAND, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, 751 F.3d 804, May 14, 2014, Decided.

Sykes Circuit Judge.
This is a sweeping challenge to Wisconsin's campaign-finance law in light of Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753 (2010). Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., and its State Political Action Committee—its "PAC" for state elections—sued to block the enforcement of many state statutes and rules against groups that spend money for political speech independently of candidates and parties. The complaint alleges that the challenged laws are vague and overbroad and unjustifiably burden the free-speech rights of independent political speakers in violation of the First Amendment.

This is our second encounter with the case. When it was last here, we addressed a single claim by the Wisconsin Right to Life State PAC: a challenge to section 11.26(4) of the Wisconsin Statutes, which caps at $10,000 the aggregate annual amount a donor may give to state and local candidates, political parties, and political committees. See Wis. Right to Life State Political Action Comm. v. Barland ("Barland I"), 664 F.3d 139, 143 (7th Cir. 2011). Applying Citizens United, we held that the aggregate contribution limit is unconstitutional as applied to organizations that independently spend money on election-related speech and permanently enjoined its enforcement against independent-expenditure groups and their donors. Id. at 155. Our ruling anticipated the Supreme Court's recent decision in McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 188 L. Ed. 2d 468 (2014), which more broadly invalidated the aggregate contribution limit in federal law.

The case returns on the remaining claims, which target a dizzying array of statutes and rules, from Wisconsin's ban on political spending by corporations to the interlocking definitions that determine state "political committee" status to the "noncoordination" oath and disclaimer requirements for independent political messages, to name just a few. The case comes to us from a decision granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court enjoined the ban on corporate political spending, partially enjoined a regulatory disclaimer rule, and denied the rest of the motion. The plaintiffs appealed.

We vacate the court's order and remand with instructions to enter a new injunction. First, the present injunction order is improper in form and must be reentered to conform to the specificity requirements of Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On the merits, in the domain of campaign-finance law, the First Amendment requires a heightened degree of regulatory clarity and a close fit between the government's means and its end, and some forms of regulation are categorically impermissible.

Like other campaign-finance systems, Wisconsin's is labyrinthian and difficult to decipher without a background in this area of the law; in certain critical respects, it violates the constitutional limits on the government's power to regulate independent political speech. Part of the problem is that the state's basic campaign-finance law—Chapter 11 of the Wisconsin Statutes—has not been updated to keep pace with the evolution in Supreme Court doctrine marking the boundaries on the government's authority to regulate election-related speech. In addition, key administrative rules do not cohere well with the statutes, introducing a patchwork of new and different terms, definitions, and burdens on independent political speakers, the intent and cumulative effect of which is to enlarge the reach of the statutory scheme. Finally, the state elections agency has given conflicting signals about its intent to enforce some aspects of the regulatory mélange.

Whether the agency has the statutory authority to regulate in this way is a serious question of state administrative law on which no state court has weighed in. As we explained in Barland I, the district judge initially abstained in this case to await a ruling from the Wisconsin Supreme Court on the scope of the agency's authority and a possible limiting construction on one of the rules challenged here. 664 F.3d at 143-45. But the state high court split evenly, with one justice recused, and the original action was dismissed without decision. See Wis. Prosperity Network v. Myse, 2012 WI 27, 339 Wis. 2d 243, 810 N.W.2d 356 (Wis. 2012) (per curiam). So we must take the regulatory scheme as we find it, testing it against federal constitutional standards.

Certain statutory provisions—the ban on corporate political spending and the cap on the amount a corporation may spend to raise money for an affiliated PAC—are obviously unconstitutional under Citizens United and our decision in Barland I. Other statutes and rules fail First Amendment standards as applied to independent political speakers. Some of the challenged provisions withstand constitutional scrutiny. We will identify the constitutional infirmities as we move through our analysis, and on remand a new, permanent injunction should be entered in accordance with this opinion. One statute—the 24-hour-reporting requirement for late contributions and expenditures—was recently amended to enlarge the reporting time to 48 hours. If the plaintiffs want to challenge the amended statute, they will have to do so in the first instance in the district court.
Full Opinion: http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/r ... 345358:S:0
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Re: 1st Amendment Thread

Post by de officiis » Sat Dec 03, 2016 7:30 am

Seaton v. Wiener, Civil No. 14-1016 (DWF/JSM), UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA, May 19, 2014, Filed

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. 6). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiffs' motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Linda C. Runbeck, and Scott M. Dutcher (together, the "Candidate Plaintiffs") are current and former candidates for Minnesota state office. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 6-7.) Plaintiff Runbeck is the state representative for Minnesota District 38A and is running for reelection in 2014. (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff Dutcher ran and lost the state legislative race for Minnesota District 12A in 2012. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiffs Douglas P. Seaton and Van L. Carlson (together, the "Donor Plaintiffs") are campaign donors who "would like to make contributions of more than half the individual contribution limit and to be able to do so without disadvantaging the candidates to whom [they] contribute[]." (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 4-5.)

At the heart of Plaintiffs' lawsuit is the "special sources" limit set by Minnesota statute. (Id. ¶ 14.) In particular, Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Minn. Stat. § 10A.27, subd. 11—insofar as it restricts donations from "large contributors"—in light of the recent United States Supreme Court decision, McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 188 L. Ed. 2d 468 (2014). Minn. Stat. § 10A.27, subd. 11, states:

Contributions from certain types of contributors. A candidate must not permit the candidate's principal campaign committee to accept a contribution from a political committee, political fund, lobbyist, large contributor, or association not registered with the board if the contribution will cause the aggregate contributions from those types of contributors during an election cycle segment to exceed an amount equal to 20 percent of the election cycle segment expenditure limits for the office sought by the candidate, provided that the 20 percent limit must be rounded to the nearest $100. For purposes of this subdivision, "large contributor" means an individual, other than the candidate, who contributes an amount that is more than one-half the amount an individual may contribute during the election cycle segment.

Minn. Stat. § 10A.27, subd. 11. Plaintiffs' Complaint asserts that the special sources limit as applied to "large contributions" violates Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights of free speech and association. (See Compl. ¶¶ 109-14.)


CONCLUSION

As stated by the Honorable Paul A. Crotty , "today's reality is that the voices of 'we the people' are too often drowned out by the few who have great resources." New York Progress & Protection PAC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57477, 2014 WL 1641781, at *1.

[T]he anticorruption interest that drives Congress to regulate campaign contributions is a far broader, more important interest than the [McCutcheon] plurality acknowledges. It is an interest in maintaining the integrity of our public governmental institutions. And it is an interest rooted in the Constitution and in the First Amendment itself.
McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1466-67 (Breyer, J., dissenting). "Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder." McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 153, 124 S. Ct. 619, 157 L. Ed. 2d 491 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365-66. Instead of focusing on such legitimate concerns, the McCutcheon decision "understates the importance of protecting the political integrity of our governmental institutions" and "creates a loophole that will allow a single individual to contribute millions of dollars to a political party or to a candidate's campaign." McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1465 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

Although the undersigned may not agree with the Supreme Court's recent line of cases on the subject of campaign finance, and their effect on the integrity of our public governmental institutions, the Court acknowledges that it is nevertheless bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court. As such, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they are likely to prevail on their constitutional claim and that the other Dataphase factors support the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. Because Plaintiffs have met their burden to show that injunctive relief is warranted, the Court grants Plaintiffs' motion. In light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in McCutcheon, the Court enjoins Defendants from enforcing the provisions of Minn. Stat. § 10A.27, subd. 11, with respect to individual "large contributors."
ORDER

Based upon the files, records, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiffs' Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Doc. No. [6]) is GRANTED.

2. Defendants are ENJOINED from enforcing Minn. Stat. § 10A.27, subd. 11, as applied to individuals who contribute to candidates in amounts equal to more than one-half of the individual contribution limit.

Dated: May 19, 2014

/s/ Donovan W. Frank

Full Opinion: http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/di ... /137841/28
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Re: 1st Amendment Thread

Post by de officiis » Sat Dec 03, 2016 7:30 am

VERMONT RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC. AND VERMONT RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE — FUND FOR INDEPENDENT POLITICAL EXPENDITURES v. SORRELL, No. 12-2904-cv, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, July 2, 2014, Decided

Droney, Circuit Judge:
The two Plaintiffs-Appellants here are Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc. ("VRLC") and Vermont Right to Life Committee — Fund for Independent Political Expenditures ("VRLC-FIPE"). VRLC is a Vermont non-profit corporation and VRLC-FIPE is a political committee formed under Vermont law. Both advocate the "universal recognition of the sanctity of human life from conception through natural death." J.A. 657, ECF No. 34. VRLC challenges three disclosure provisions of Vermont's elections laws, contending that they are unconstitutionally vague and violate VRLC's freedom of speech. First, VRLC challenges the statute requiring that "electioneering communications" identify their sponsor. Second, VRLC challenges the statute requiring that groups engaged in any "mass media activity" must submit certain reports to the Vermont Secretary of State and relevant candidates. Third, VRLC challenges Vermont's definition of "political committees" and its requirement that such committees submit campaign finance reports. VRLC-FIPE raises an as-applied challenge to Vermont's limit on contributions to political committees, contending that VRLC-FIPE is an independent-expenditure-only group and therefore the limit violates its freedom of speech. The Defendants-Appellees are various Vermont officials responsible for enforcing Vermont's elections laws. The district court (Sessions, J.) granted Defendants summary judgment on every claim. We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Full Opinion: http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/i ... /1/hilite/
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Re: 1st Amendment Thread

Post by de officiis » Sat Dec 03, 2016 7:31 am

Center for Individual Freedom, Inc. v. Tennant, 706 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2013)

FLOYD, Circuit Judge:
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. Const. amend. I. In its now-famous Citizens United v. FEC decision, the Supreme Court recognized that the First Amendment "has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a campaign for political office." 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753 (2010) (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223, 109 S. Ct. 1013, 103 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, at the same time, the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of providing the electorate with information about the source of campaign spending—even when these disclosure requirements burden election-related speech. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196, 124 S. Ct. 619, 157 L. Ed. 2d 491 (2003), overruled on other grounds by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64, 66-67, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976) (per curiam). In this case, we confront the delicate balance between protecting political speech and informing the electorate about the organizations that bankroll modern elections. Specifically, we consider whether West Virginia's campaign-finance reporting and disclaimer requirements can survive constitutional scrutiny.

Appellee and Cross-Appellant Center for Individual Freedom (CFIF) and Appellee West Virginians for Life (WVFL) are § 501(c)(4) organizations that engage in election-related speech. These organizations and Zane Lawhorn1—a West Virginia resident who wishes to receive WVFL's communications—brought suit against West Virginia's secretary of state, members of the West Virginia State Election Commission, and a class of West Virginia's prosecuting attorneys, alleging that West Virginia's campaign finance statutes were constitutionally impermissible. The district court struck down some of the provisions and upheld other portions of the statutory scheme, and both West Virginia2 and CFIF appealed. We now affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Full Opinion: http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/app ... 01-18.html
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Re: 1st Amendment Thread

Post by de officiis » Sat Dec 03, 2016 7:31 am

Florida doctors cannot discuss gun safety with patients, says court

Warren Richey - 7/25/14
A federal appeals court on Friday upheld a Florida law that seeks to bar doctors from discussing firearms safety with their patients – including inquiring whether they keep any guns at home.

The action reversed a 2012 injunction issued by a federal judge in Miami, who ruled that the Florida law violated the free-speech rights of physicians to counsel their patients about health-related matters.

The appeals court panel voted 2 to 1 to uphold the Florida law.

The measure, the Firearm Owners’ Privacy Act, was passed in 2011 in response to an American Medical Association policy that encouraged doctors to inquire about the presence of firearms in homes with children. The AMA policy was designed to help raise awareness and protect children from gun-related accidents.

Despite these good intentions, several would-be patients and the parents of children seeking medical services perceived the questions about gun ownership as intrusive and offensive.

In one case, medical staff members separated a mother from her children and then asked the children whether their mother owned any firearms.

In another instance, a mother refused to answer questions about whether she kept a gun at home, telling the physician that she felt the question was an invasion of her privacy. The pediatrician then informed the mother that she had 30 days to find a new doctor for her child.

The Florida law sought to protect patients’ privacy by restricting nonrelevant inquiries and record keeping by physicians about firearms. Violators could lose their license and face up to $10,000 in fines.

A group of physicians and medical associations responded to the new statute by filing a federal lawsuit. They argued that the law violated the First Amendment by imposing a content-based restriction on their speech.

Lawyers for the state countered that the Florida law was merely a regulation of professional conduct and imposed only an incidental burden on the physicians’ speech.

Other parts of the law sought to prevent discrimination and harassment by doctors. This was a regulation of conduct, not speech, the state lawyers argued.

In reversing the lower court injunction, the appeals court agreed with the state.

“We find that the Act is a valid regulation of professional conduct that has only incidental effect on physicians’ speech,” Judge Gerald Tjoflat wrote for the court. “As such, the Act does not facially violate the First Amendment.”

The judge added: “The Act simply codifies that good medical care does not require inquiry or record-keeping regarding firearms when unnecessary to a patient’s care.”

Judge Tjoflat noted that one part of the law seeks to prevent harassment of patients by doctors seeking to “pursue an agenda unrelated to medical care or safety.”
Such harassment would probably occur when a doctor had no relevant reason to ask about someone’s possession of guns in the home, he said. In contrast, the judge said, a physician dealing with a suicidal patient “may wish to attempt to persuade the patient to remove firearms from the patient’s home.”

The judge said fears that doctors will be subject to discipline for offending their patient’s sensibilities were “unfounded.”

“So long as a physician is operating in good faith within the boundaries of good medical practice, and is providing only firearm safety advice which is relevant and necessary, he or she need not fear discipline at the hands of the [state licensing] Board or a money judgment in a court of law,” Tjoflat said.

In a dissent, Judge Charles Wilson said he would find the Florida law unconstitutional as a legislative act that seeks to silence doctors’ “disfavored message about firearm safety.”

“This law is ... designed to stop a perceived political agenda, and it is difficult to conceive of any law designed for that purpose that could withstand First Amendment scrutiny,” he said.

“Simply put, the Act is a gag order that prevents doctors from even asking the first question in a conversation about firearms,” Judge Wilson said.

“The Act prohibits or significantly chills doctors from expressing their views and providing information to patients about one topic and one topic only, firearms,” he said.
“Regardless of whether we agree with the message conveyed by doctors to patients about firearms, I think it is perfectly clear that doctors have a First Amendment right to convey that message,” Wilson said.

Wilson said the decision was unprecedented because it held essentially that licensed professionals have no First Amendment rights when they are speaking to clients or patients in private. “This in turn says that patients have no First Amendment right to receive information from licensed professionals – a frightening prospect,” he said.

The case is Wollschlaeger v. Governor of the State of Florida (12-14009)
Link to AP article: http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/ ... TE=DEFAULT
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Re: 1st Amendment Thread

Post by de officiis » Sat Dec 03, 2016 7:32 am

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE CULTURE WARS

Douglas Laycock

2014 U. Ill. L. Rev. 839
Religious liberty has become much more controversial in recent years. A principal reason is deep disagreements over sexual morality. On abortion, contraception, gay rights, and same-sex marriage, conservative religious leaders condemn as grave evils what many other Americans view as fundamental human rights. Somewhat hidden in the battles over permitting abortion and recognizing same-sex marriage lie religious liberty issues about exempting conscientious objectors from facilitating abortions or same-sex marriages. Banning contraception is no longer a live issue; there, religious liberty is the principal issue. These culture-war issues are turning many Americans toward a very narrow understanding of religious liberty, and generating arguments that threaten religious liberty more generally. Persistent Catholic opposition to the French Revolution permanently turned France to a very narrow view of religious liberty; persistent religious opposition to the Sexual Revolution may be having similar consequences here.

The Article argues that we can and should protect the liberty of both sides in the culture wars; that conservative churches would do well to concede the liberty of the other side, including on same-sex marriage, and concentrate on defending their own liberty as conscientious objectors; and similarly, that supporters of rights to abortion, contraception, gay rights, and same-sex marriage would do well to concentrate on securing their own rights and to concede that conscientious objectors should rarely be required to support or facilitate practices they view as evil.

The Article offers a detailed analysis of the Final Rules that attempt to insulate objecting religious institutions from having to "contract, arrange, pay, or refer for" contraception. These rules offer very substantial protection to religious institutions, but they have not ended the litigation. Litigation on behalf of religious not-for-profit organizations remains at an early stage. Test cases on for-profit employers are now pending in the Supreme Court. Those cases present different issues, but this Article argues that it is at least clear that Congress understood the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to apply to for-profit businesses.
Full Article: http://illinoislawreview.org/wp-content ... aycock.pdf
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Re: 1st Amendment Thread

Post by de officiis » Sat Dec 03, 2016 7:32 am

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Court Won't Resurrect Atheists' 'Ground Zero Cross' Lawsuit

Brett Snider, Esq. - July 29, 2014
The "Ground Zero cross" gleaned from the wreckage of the World Trade Center can remain at the 9/11 memorial site despite concerns about church-state division.

The 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a 2013 ruling allowing the steel-reinforced cross to stay at Ground Zero, finding that despite its likeness to the Christian symbol, its purpose is secular, reports Reuters. An atheist group has been fighting the inclusion of the "cross" as a publicly funded religious symbol in state and federal courts.

Is the Ground Zero "miracle cross" here to stay?

'Cross' is Secular, Court Finds

Back when we last blogged about this story, we noted that the attorney for the group called American Atheists said the 17-foot-tall piece of intersecting steel bars "screams Christianity." But in upholding the dismissal of the "Ground Zero cross" lawsuit, the 2nd Circuit disagreed, noting that the piece of fused metal had a "secular purpose."

For government-approved displays like the Ground Zero cross to pass constitutional muster under the Establishment Clause, they must have a secular purpose. The 2nd Circuit opined that "secular" doesn't have to mean completely divorced from religion, especially given the interweaving of religious themes in many historical artifacts. Along this line of reasoning, the Ground Zero cross may incidentally be a religious symbol, but its actual purpose in being displayed is to "recount[] the history of extraordinary events."

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No Separate Atheist Plaque

The 2nd Circuit also rejected an attempt to include a separate plaque reminding viewers of the "cross" of those atheists who died in the 9/11 terror attacks. The court felt that the display was constitutional without the plaque, and that viewers would not take this as a slight to the atheists who were killed.

Perhaps David Silverman, president of American Atheists, feels somewhat slighted. The New York Daily News reports that Silverman views the 2nd Circuit's decision as a prime example "of Christian privilege and prejudice in this country."
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de officiis
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Re: 1st Amendment Thread

Post by de officiis » Sat Dec 03, 2016 7:35 am

Boden Lecture: The Real Problem With Citizens United: Campaign Finance, Dark Money, And Shadow Parties

Heather K. Gerken*

97 Marq. L. Rev. 903 (Summer 2014)

* J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law, Yale Law School
Today I will use my forty-three minutes to offer food for thought. Not a fully-worked-out theory, not a firm claim, but a series of observations about the current state of campaign-finance law and its long-term effects on American politics.

Here's what I'm not going to say: I'm not going to tell you the near-ubiquitous tale that reformers, reporters, and even a fair number of academics tell about the current state of campaign finance. That story is that the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United 1 treated corporations as if they were individuals for the first time. It thereby ushered in a new era of corporate spending, with wealthy corporations spending wildly, saturating the airwaves, and taking over American politics. The story is that Citizens United has caused a sea change in American politics, and the Court's overturning of Austin 2 - the much-revered case in which the Court upheld campaign-finance regulations in order to promote equality - was the modern-day equivalent of Plessy v. Ferguson. 3

Even setting aside the overwrought reference to Plessy, almost all of that story is wrong, and some of it is utter nonsense. And I say that not as someone who is against campaign-finance regulation, but as someone who believes in it. I say that as someone who believes that there is a bigger story about the relationship between Citizens United and American politics; it's just not the story the media and reformers are telling.

Here I will argue that the so-called "dark money" trend may be a symptom of a deeper shift taking place in our political process. And it is one that Citizens United has helped bring about. Citizens United mattered, but not for the reasons that most people seem to think. Here, in short, I hope to tell you the real problem with Citizens United.

Part I offers a brief history of campaign-finance reform and debunks the conventional wisdom about the case. It ends by suggesting that Citizens United mattered for reasons that have little to do with corporations or equality. Instead, the most important part of the opinion concerned the relationship between independent spending and corruption.

Part II shows how the Court's corruption ruling has changed the political landscape. We all know that there is more "dark money" in the system - money spent by sources that are virtually untraceable - and we all know how troubling it is to have large amounts of dark money flowing through the election system. But the conventional wisdom may be missing something more fundamental about the effects of Citizens United: The decision may ultimately push our current party system toward one that is dominated by powerful groups acting outside the formal party structure. The worry, then, isn't so much about dark money, but "shadow parties" - organizations outside of the party that house the party elites.

Part III explains why the emergence of shadow parties could further weaken our already-flagging political system. It suggests that shadow parties risk undermining the influence of politics' saving grace: the "party faithful," who play a crucial role in connecting everyday citizens to party elites.
Full Article: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol97/iss4/3/
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