4th Amendment Thread

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Re: 4th Amendment Thread

Post by de officiis » Fri Dec 02, 2016 8:18 pm

The Perceived Intrusiveness of Searching Electronic Devices at the Border: An Empirical Study

Matthew B. Kugler

81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1165 (Summer 2014)

Abstract:
This paper presents new empirical data that seeks to quantify the privacy interests and expectations of regular people in the context of a border crossing. Courts have previously disagreed about whether travelers understand that their electronic devices are subject to search at the border, and whether such searches are more intrusive than routine examinations of traveler luggage. The data presented here show that, consistent with the view the 9th Circuit recently adopted in its controversial Cotterman decision, ordinary people believe that searches of their electronic devices impinge more on their privacy and dignity interests than do most traditional searches. In fact, survey participants tended to rate electronic searches as being almost as intrusive as strip and body cavity searches. In addition, the overwhelming majority of participants believed that their electronic devices could not be searched at a border crossing unless the customs agent had some level of individualized suspicion, suggesting that current doctrine creates substantial risk of surprise. These data will hopefully serve to shed light on the new issues raised by searches of electronic devices in an era of smartphones, tablets, and cloud computing.
Full Article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? ... id=2402244
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Re: 4th Amendment Thread

Post by de officiis » Fri Dec 02, 2016 8:20 pm

What Really is at Stake with the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and Ideas for Future Surveillance Reform

Stephanie Cooper Blum
Department of Homeland Security; Michigan State University

May 4, 2009

Boston University Public Interest Law Journal, Spring 2009

Abstract:
The need to reconcile domestic intelligence requirements with the protection of civil liberties is a recurring and prominent theme in the war on terror. While this tension between domestic intelligence gathering and civil liberties can be seen in many contexts since 9/11, this Article focuses on the Bush administration’s Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), where the National Security Agency (NSA) secretly wiretapped Americans without traditional Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrants and the resulting FISA reform legislation culminating in the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA). In July 2008, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed suit against the FAA arguing that it is unconstitutional; this Article, however, argues that the FAA is most likely lawful and appears to be a nuanced compromise between the legitimate need to expeditiously gather intelligence against terrorists and the protection of Americans’ civil liberties. In order to draw this conclusion, it is necessary to understand what traditional FISA requires, how the TSP program departed from that rubric, and how advances in technology and the nature of terrorism have impacted intelligence gathering.

Part I of this Article analyzes the legal framework of domestic spying and discusses the Fourth Amendment, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, FISA, and changes made to FISA with the USA Patriot Act. Part II analyzes the Bush administration’s warrantless surveillance program and whether, and to what extent, it violated the law. Part III discusses the challenges posed by terrorism to intelligence gathering and the need for modifications to FISA. Part IV analyzes the FAA of July 2008 and ponders whether it is just the perception that civil liberties could be eroded, or whether Americans’ civil liberties truly are at risk. Finally, in Part V, this Article argues that in some ways the FAA has not gone far enough in addressing the underlying problems with conducting surveillance of terrorists and suggests areas for future reform.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? ... id=1398831
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Re: 4th Amendment Thread

Post by de officiis » Fri Dec 02, 2016 8:20 pm

Spying on Americans: At What Point Does The NSA’s Collection and Searching of Metadata Violate The Fourth Amendment?

Elizabeth Atkins

10 Wash. J.L. Tech. & Arts 51 (9/22/2014)
Edward Snowden became a household name on June 5, 2013, when he leaked highly classified documents revealing that the American Government was spying on its citizens. The information exposed that the National Security Agency (NSA) collected millions of American’s metadata through forced cooperation with telephone-service providers. Metadata contains sensitive and private information about a person’s life. When collected and searched, metadata can reveal a portrait of a person’s intimate activities amounting to a violation of one’s reasonable expectation of privacy.

This Article suggests changing the current standard allowing the NSA to collect and search metadata under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. The threshold needed to obtain and search a person’s metadata should be raised from the current standard of reasonable and articulable suspicion to a higher burden of probable cause. Since Mr. Snowden’s unauthorized disclosure, there has been public outcry regarding metadata collection. In response, President Obama issued a Public Policy Directive limiting the scope of metadata that the NSA can collect. Additionally, Congress has proposed legislation changing how the NSA collects, stores, and searches metadata. The bills, however, keep intact the minimum reasonable and articulable standard necessary to search metadata.

The breadth of information that can be gleaned from metadata makes it intrusive and subjects it to the Fourth Amendment. Yet gathering and searching metadata can be a valuable tool in the fight against terrorism and protecting American citizens from future attacks. Requiring the threshold to be raised to a probable cause determination adequately balances privacy interests against national security interests.
http://digital.law.washington.edu/dspac ... sequence=4
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Re: 4th Amendment Thread

Post by de officiis » Fri Dec 02, 2016 8:20 pm

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GOVERNMENT-IMPOSED BODILY INTRUSIONS

Caitlin E. Borgmann

2014 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1059
This Article breaks new ground in undertaking a comprehensive analysis of Supreme Court case law addressing government-imposed bodily intrusions of all kinds, analyzing the relationship between Fourth Amendment and substantive due process protections in this context, critiquing the Court's severance of that relationship, and proposing a unified constitutional theory for the right against bodily intrusions.

Part II of this Article begins with an overview of the common law roots and constitutional sources of protection for the right against government-imposed bodily intrusions. Part III comprehensively examines the Supreme Court's treatment of such intrusions. Part IV reexamines the right against bodily intrusions in light of the case law and proposes a unified framework for assessing alleged violations that recognizes substantive due process as the source of the right and the appropriate starting point for analysis. Part IV concludes by discussing recent and ongoing litigation in the Supreme Court and in the lower federal courts, respectively, over two kinds of bodily intrusions - forced blood draws and pre-abortion ultrasound mandates - and considers how these intrusions might fare under the proposed framework.
Full Article: http://illinoislawreview.org/wp-content ... rgmann.pdf
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Re: 4th Amendment Thread

Post by de officiis » Fri Dec 02, 2016 8:21 pm

The 'Barney Fife Loophole' to the Fourth Amendment

A case before the Supreme Court asks whether police can stop drivers for doing something that isn't a crime if the officers have misunderstood the law.

Garrett Eppsoct - The Atlantic - Oct. 3, 2014
“There’s not a Barney Fife defense to the violation of the Fourth Amendment,” the legendary advocate Pamela Karlan once told the Supreme Court. The Court disagreed, and held that a police officer had validly arrested a man even though the warrant he relied on had been revoked months before.

Heien v. North Carolina, a case to be argued Monday in front of the Supreme Court, will tell us whether Barney’s loophole is even bigger. Coincidentally, speaking of Barney, this case happened in the hometown of actor Andy Griffith: Mt. Airy, North Carolina, population 10,417.*

On April 29, 2009, Surry County Sheriff’s Deputy Matt Darisse parked by Highway 77 working “criminal interdiction,” a term which seems to mean looking for folks who don’t look right. During his shift, Maynor Javier Vasquez drove by, with the owner of the car, Nicholas Heien, asleep in the back seat.

Darisse became suspicious of Vasquez. It’s a little unclear, why, though: In court, Darisse reasoned that the driver “was gripping the steering wheel at a “10-and-two” position, looking straight ahead”—driving like a regular person, in other words. Darisse followed the car until it came to a stoplight. At that point, he noticed one brake light was out. He stopped the vehicle.

Under the Fourth Amendment, police who want to stop a car need “reasonable suspicion” that someone in it has committed a crime. Once they’ve made a valid stop, they can pull the driver and passengers out for a frisk; bring in drug-sniffing dogs; or ask “consent” to search the car without explaining that the driver has the right to refuse. If permission is refused, they can detain the driver and passengers for hours while they seek a search warrant; and if the driver has committed any offense, even failing to wear a seat belt, they can make an arrest.

That’s the scenario in Heien. Darisse asked Heien for permission to search the car; Heien agreed, and the officers found a baggie full of cocaine.

After Vazquez and Heien were arrested, however, their lawyers made a startling discovery: North Carolina apparently hasn’t fully revised its automobile code since before the days of brake lights. Under state law, a car’s only required to have “a stop lamp on the rear of the vehicle.” Yes, “a stop lamp”—not “two brake lights,” as Deputy Darisse and most of the rest of us would assume.

As interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment creates an exclusionary rule, under which an unconstitutional stop is a “poisonous tree,” and anything that is discovered in a search afterwards is tainted “fruit.” It can’t be used in evidence, and, as then-Judge Benjamin Cardozo wrote, “[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.” There are exceptions; there won’t be any exclusion when police make certain kinds of factual mistakes—a warrant that was improperly granted by a judge, for example, or clerical errors in the warrant itself—if the mistakes are reasonable and made in good faith.

Heien asks about the next step: What if the police officer has a “reasonable suspicion” that the driver has done something that turns out not to be against the law? The North Carolina Supreme Court refused to suppress the cocaine, reasoning that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule wouldn’t apply. “An officer may make a mistake, including a mistake of law, yet still act reasonably under the circumstances,” the justices held.

But there’s a slight contradiction here. Ignorance of the law is no defense—even if someone makes a “reasonable” mistake. As recently as 1971, the Supreme Court repeated that “[t]he principle that ignorance of the law is no defense applies whether the law be a statute or a duly promulgated and published regulation.” Dozens of lower-court cases since then have reiterated this warning.

Federal and state statutes run to millions of words—they are so complicated that civil-liberties lawyer Harvey Silverglate once wrote that the average American commits three federal felonies a day. If regular people, who lack legal training, are expected to know and follow complicated these laws, is it too much to expect that sheriff’s deputies know the motor-vehicle code they are paid to enforce? Lower courts are split on the issue, but most have held that if an officer makes a mistake about the law, that mistake cannot be used as justification for a stop.

...

Following this summer’s police shooting in Ferguson, Missouri, there’s a heightened awareness in America that many cops’ gut feelings about whom they should stop are a lot less objective than they often claim after the fact. This case, which shows that driving with your hands at “10 and two” is somehow enough to get a cop on a driver’s tail, will test just how much protection the Fourth Amendment offers to citizens who are guilty or innocent—or just trying to get somewhere.
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/arc ... _page=true
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Re: 4th Amendment Thread

Post by de officiis » Fri Dec 02, 2016 8:22 pm

This is America? Secret courts, no Fourth Amendment and … magic pixie dust

Marcy Wheeler - Salon.com 11/20/14
The USA Freedom Act died in the Senate Tuesday night. With it went a provision for a weak advocate to provide at least the beginnings of an adversarial position in the secret FISA court for more exotic requests. The measure would have allowed the FISC to consider viewpoints outside that of the government while still retaining the court’s secrecy.

Even as that effort to do something to make the FISA court less like – as Sen. Richard Blumenthal said during Tuesday’s debate — the ”Star Chamber,” the British king’s old secret court, failed, the government released a transcript from a hearing at the FISA Court of Review, the appellate court to the FISC. The hearing considered Yahoo’s challenge to the Protect America Act, a precursor to today’s PRISM program, which required the Internet provider to hand over customer data in response to government “directives” rather than warrants.

Some of the claims judges made in the secret hearing would be funny — perhaps were meant to be — if they weren’t so alarming, coming from a judge working in secret. For example, perhaps as a way of arguing the Fourth Amendment only requires searches to be reasonable, not require warrants, Judge Morris Arnold noted that “the warrant clause is at the bottom end of the Fourth Amendment.” As if sticking the requirement for warrants at the back end of a constitutional amendment made it optional.

Other comments were downright troubling, as when Arnold suggested Yahoo hadn’t been injured by the government’s demand that it help it spy on their customers. “Well, if this order is enforced and it’s secret, how can you be hurt?” Arnold asked. “The people don’t know that — that they’re being monitored in some way.” Arnold continued, “I mean, what’s — what’s the — what’s your — what’s the damage to your consumer?”

The most substantively outrageous comments came from Acting Solicitor General Gregory Garre. To dismiss any Fourth Amendment concerns about the American side of communications collected along with a target, Garre claimed “incidentally” collected Americans’ content “is either destroyed” … “and not used or disseminated.” He then claimed “there is no database that is taken from incidental collections.”

That claim made it into FISCR’s final ruling to justify the court’s finding that the incidental collection of large amounts of Americans’ data did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. “The government assures us that it does not maintain a database of incidentally collected information from non-targeted United States persons, and there is no evidence to the contrary,” the opinion read. “On these facts, incidentally collected communications of non-targeted United States persons do not violate the Fourth Amendment.” Even when that claim was first revealed five years ago, it was pretty clear it was not true. Since then we’ve learned the government not only keeps that data, meaning it does, in fact, have the database it claimed in secret it didn’t have. We’ve also learned the government searches Americans’ names and email addresses, even before it has evidence of wrongdoing against them. The FBI does it so frequently, they cannot count how often they do.

That’s not the only gross misrepresentation the government told in the secrecy of America’s Star Chamber.

Later in the hearing, Garre pointed to the order the government uses to authorize its spying activities, Executive Order 12333, to prove that it did not spy on Americans overseas without conducting some kind of review that the American is some kind of agent of a foreign power. He emphasized the longevity of the EO. “It was issued in 1981,” Garre said in 2008, ” and that is an order that has been followed. I don’t think anyone disputes that it’s been followed.” Garre offered up — but did not deliver — “a discussion or explanation of the manner in which Section 2.5 has been carried out over the past few decades.” Judge Arnold asked, “Your main point is that this wasn’t just something hoped [sic] up for present purposes; it’s been in effect for quite some time?” Garre answered, “That’s exactly right.”

Only it wasn’t exactly right.

As Salon has noted, just six months before Garre made those comments, Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse revealed how the EO had in reality been treated during the years it authorized a warrantless wiretap program. In fact, sometime earlier in the Bush administration, DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel, a department that interprets the law for the executive branch, had ruled that, “An executive order cannot limit a President,” Whitehouse read from language he got declassified to read before the Senate. ”There is no constitutional requirement for a President to issue a new executive order whenever he wishes to depart from the terms of a previous executive order. Rather than violate an executive order, the President has instead modified or waived it.” As described, the EO Garre claimed was so rock solid was actually closer to pixie dust.

Whitehouse made clear when he revealed this language not only that it pertained to EO 12333 — the EO Garre presented as a decades-old unchanging mandate — but to precisely the protections for Americans overseas. Whitehouse explained, “Here is what legally prevents this President from wiretapping Americans traveling abroad at will: nothing. Nothing.”

Yet that’s not the story the government told a panel of judges in secret in 2008. And that’s not the story the judges used to rule the collection of emails from top providers in the U.S. to be constitutional.
http://www.salon.com/2014/11/20/this_is ... ixie_dust/
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Re: 4th Amendment Thread

Post by de officiis » Fri Dec 02, 2016 8:23 pm

TriggerFish, StingRays, and Fourth Amendment Fishing Expeditions

Brian L. Owsley - 66 Hastings L.J. 183 (Dec. 2014)
Cell site simulators are an electronic surveillance device that mimics a cell tower causing all nearby cell phones to register their data and information with the cell site simulator. Law enforcement increasingly relies on these devices during the course of routine criminal investigations.

The use of cell site simulators raises several concerns. First, the federal government seeks judicial authorization to use such devices via a pen register application. This approach is problematic because a cell site simulator is different than a pen register. Moreover, the standard for issuance of a pen register is very low. Instead, this Article proposes that the applicable standard for granting a request to use a cell site simulator should be based on the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard.

Second, cell site simulators sweep up the data and information of innocent third-parties. The government fails to account for this problem. This Article proposes that the granting of an application for a cell site simulator should require a protocol for dealing with the third-party information that is captured.
http://www.hastingslawjournal.org/wp-co ... y-66.1.pdf
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Re: 4th Amendment Thread

Post by de officiis » Fri Dec 02, 2016 8:23 pm

National Security and the Constitution: A Conversation Between Walter F. Mondale and Robert A. Stein

by Walter F. Mondale, Robert A. Stein, & Monica C. Fahnhorst - 98 Minn. L. Rev. 2011 (2014)
Professor Robert A. Stein, Dean of the University of Minnesota Law School for fifteen years and former Chief Operating Officer of the American Bar Association, endowed this lecture series to enrich the program of the University of Minnesota Law School by inviting leaders of the bench and bar and of the governments of the United States and other nations to deliver an annual lecture on a topic of national or international interest. Former Vice President of the United States Walter F. Mondale was invited to speak at the Inaugural Stein Lecture and engaged in a conversation with Professor Stein regarding the juxtaposition of national security and the Constitution.
http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-co ... st_MLR.pdf
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Re: 4th Amendment Thread

Post by de officiis » Fri Dec 02, 2016 8:23 pm

Cybercrime and the Fourth Amendment

Panelists talked about cyber information and the fourth amendment. 

The Justice Department’s Criminal Division and the Georgetown Law Center hosted a series of panel discussions on federal efforts to combat cybercrime.

http://www.c-span.org/video/?323068-3/d ... -amendment
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Re: 4th Amendment Thread

Post by de officiis » Fri Dec 02, 2016 8:23 pm

FISA’s Fuzzy Line between Domestic and International Terrorism

Nick Harper - 81 U. Chic. L. Rev. 1123 (2014)

INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 19781 (FISA) regulates, among other things, the government’s acquisition of electronic surveillance within the United States for foreign intelligence purposes. FISA allows a federal officer to seek an order from a judge at a specially designated court “approving electronic surveillance of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information.”2 As long as the requisite foreign nexus can be shown, FISA warrants are preferable to their possible substitutes because they are easier to obtain and allow for more secretive and penetrating investigations.3

Consistent with FISA’s foreign focus, the government may use the statute to investigate members of international terrorist groups within the United States.4 However, the activities of purely domestic terrorist groups do not fall under FISA and must therefore be investigated using standard criminal- investigative tools.5 Often, terrorists will easily be identified as international; members of designated “foreign terrorist organizations” operating within the United States are clearly international terrorists. But the proliferation of modern communication technologies has caused increasing slippage between the definitions of domestic and international terrorism. For example, many homegrown terrorists are inspired by international groups to commit attacks in the United States.6 In many cases, the government seems to classify these actors as international terrorists based on Internet activity that ranges from viewing and posting jihadist YouTube videos to planning attacks with suspected foreign terrorists in chat rooms, thus using FISA’s formidable investigatory weapons against them.7 The government is aided in this task by FISA’s definition of international terrorism, which has an extremely vague and potentially loose internationality requirement.8 An expansive interpretation of this requirement could be used to subject what might properly be considered domestic terrorist groups to FISA surveillance.

One should be concerned about both the existence and the effects of an expansive interpretation of FISA’s internationality requirement. Not only would subjecting domestic terrorist groups to FISA surveillance violate FISA itself, but such an application might also be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the FISA application and surveillance process is very secretive, lacks a true adversarial process, and is devoid of meaningful oversight. This setting offers an ideal environment for the government to push statutory and constitutional boundaries. Indeed, recent revelations from Edward Snowden offer confirmation that the government is more likely to cross constitutional lines in the name of national security when these institutional factors are present.9

This Comment proceeds as follows: Part I reviews FISA’s historical background and details the procedures for acquiring and using a FISA warrant for electronic surveillance within the United States. Part II examines the text and legislative history of the statute, focusing on the internationality requirement of the international terrorism provision. This analysis concludes that the language is broad enough to cover individuals with extremely tenuous international connections, but that Congress did not intend such an inclusive interpretation of the language. In the absence of public court opinions analyzing FISA’s internationality requirement, this Part then briefly assesses how courts have interpreted similar language in the Antiterrorism Act of 1990 (ATA).10 Part II then analyzes the limited public record of two modern cases to argue that the government likely exploits FISA’s language to encompass quasi-domestic groups that Congress did not intend the statute to cover.

Part III argues that the targeting of such quasi-domestic groups under FISA likely violates the Fourth Amendment. In so doing, this Part first examines why domestic and international terrorism are treated differently under the Fourth Amendment. After finding that domestic and international terrorism are distinguished by the latter’s triggering of the government’s foreign policy interests, this Part argues that FISA permits the targeting of groups that do not implicate these interests, posing serious constitutional concerns. This Part concludes by offering a more limited interpretation of FISA’s language that avoids potential constitutional violations while staying true to FISA’s text.
Full Article: http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/law ... er_CMT.pdf
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