2nd Amendment Thread

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District Asks Judge to Reconsider His Ruling Overturning D.C.’s Ban Carrying Guns in Public

Perry Stein - Aug. 25, 2014

D.C. lawyers are asking a federal judge who overturned the city's ban on carrying handguns in public to reconsider his ruling, arguing that the basis for his original ruling was rooted in questionable legal foundations.

Last month, U.S. District Judge Frederick Scullin Jr., a federal judge appointed to preside over the Northern District of New York, ruled that D.C.'s complete ban on carrying handguns in public is unconstitutional. He ultimately said D.C. has until Oct. 22 before the new law goes into effect, giving the city a little time to craft legislation to create a new licensing mechanism that is consistent with his ruling.

Today, the city is, as expected, hoping the ruling will be scrapped altogether, the Legal Times first reported. In a motion for reconsideration, the city argues that, contrary to Scullin's ruling, the second amendment does not actually guarantee the right to carry a firearm in public.

The Court unnecessarily determined that the right to carry a handgun in public is at the core of the Second Amendment, and failed to consider both the historical pedigree of prohibitions on public carrying and the District’s important justifications for its prohibition.

The motion also said Scullin did not follow the precedent established by the Heller vs. District of Columbia ruling—a case that made it to the Supreme Court and overturned D.C.'s ban on handguns. The case, however, did not define where these handguns could be carried:

When the parties first briefed this matter, the D.C. Circuit had not yet determined how to analyze Second Amendment challenges or the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply. Since then, the Circuit—like most other federal circuits—has adopted a two-step approach to determine the Case 1:09-cv-01482-FJS Document 63 Filed 08/25/14 Page 7 of 23-8-constitutionality of a gun law. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1252.3. That test requires a court first to determine whether a particular regulation infringes on a right protected by the Second Amendment and then, if it does, to determine whether the provision passes constitutional muster under the appropriate level of scrutiny. Id.

The Court purported to apply Heller II’s two-part test, see Order at 10, but abandoned its analysis after the first step.

Judge Scullin's ruling, according to the motion, also failed to take into account the District's landscape and why a ban on carrying hand guns is not only constitutional, but appropriate.

The District is a city, not a State. Jurisdictions with different conditions should have different gun laws; urban areas should not be governed by standards appropriate for rural
areas...

That the District is one of the most popular tourist destinations in America, attracting some 15 million visitors a year,16 and is comprised of almost one-fourth federal land further reinforces that the District’s decision to prohibit the public carrying of firearms is substantially related to the important objectives of public safety and crime prevention, given the undisputed need to protect those people and places.

http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blog ... in-public/

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Anti-Evasion Doctrines & The Second Amendment

Brannon Denning

81 Tenn. Law R. 551 (2014)

I. INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court’s holding in Heller1 that the Second Amendment2 guarantees an individual right to private gun ownership, and its subsequent incorporation of that right through the Fourteenth Amendment two years later3 has, unsurprisingly, resulted in a welter of litigation attempting to define the contours of that right. 4 Much of the current litigation challenges the constitutionality of various federal and state laws prohibiting certain persons, like felons or perpetrators of domestic violence, from possessing firearms; bans on the carrying of guns in certain places; bans of various types of weapons; and state and local licensing laws. 5

But as Professor Glenn Reynolds recently observed, a common feature of the “normal constitutional law” of individual rights is the judicial recognition and protection of “penumbral” aspects of rights. 6 By this, he means either “auxiliary protections for a core constitutional right” or “the provisions of rights that are explicitly spelled out in the Constitution. ”7 For example, the Court has invalidated laws deemed to have a “chilling effect” on free speech. 8 In other cases, additional, unenumerated rights—most notably the right of privacy—have been inferred from textual ones. 9 Reynolds speculates that as Second Amendment jurisprudence becomes more “normal, ” we might expect to see both types of penumbral protection for the right to keep and bear arms. 10

This Article draws on previous work to examine whether the courts are creating doctrine that protects penumbral Second Amendment rights in Reynolds’s first sense. It asks whether courts are “ensur[ing] that the core right is genuinely protected by creating a buffer zone that prevents officious governmental actors from stripping the right of real meaning through regulations that indirectly—but perhaps fatally—burden its exercise. ”11 Are courts, in other words, creating what Mike Kent and I elsewhere term “anti- evasion doctrines” (“AEDs”): judicially-created decision rules that prevent officials from evading prior decision rules fashioned to implement constitutional principles. 12 Or are courts engaged in what we described, in a sequel, as “anti-anti-evasion, ”13 i. e., instances in which courts decline to create AEDs.

Part II briefly summarizes our earlier work on AEDs and anti- anti-evasion. Our earlier work offers a working hypothesis that the Supreme Court will decline to create AEDs if, in its judgment, the political safeguards of a particular constitutional principle are sufficiently robust to protect that principle. 14 Part III suggests the forms that Second Amendment AEDs might take and what kinds of laws might spur calls for their creation. Part IV examines recent federal court decisions for evidence of either AEDs or anti-anti- evasion. Part IV also discusses the significance of either for both the future of the right to keep and bear arms as well as Kent’s and my working hypothesis. A brief conclusion follows.

PDF Download: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? ... id=2478705

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Theater shooting victim’s parents sue ammo seller, renew gun debate

9/17/14 - Yahoo News Digest

The parents of Jessica Ghawi, a 24-year-old aspiring sports broadcaster who was killed in the Colorado theater shootings, filed a lawsuit Tuesday accusing four online retailers of improperly selling ammunition, tear gas, a high-capacity magazine and body armor used in the attack. The lawsuit alleges it was illegal and negligent to sell the gear to James Holmes, who is accused of killing 12 people and injuring 70 in the July 20, 2012, attack. The lawsuit renews the gun control debate in the courts at a time when advocates of tighter restrictions have been relatively quiet in state and national politics, wary of motivating gun-rights voters to turn out in greater numbers.

The lawsuit says Holmes bought at least 4,300 rounds of ammunition from Lucky Gunner’s website, bulkammo.com, and 700 rounds of ammunition and a 100-round magazine from the Sportsman’s Guide website. The 100-round magazine was one factor that prompted Colorado in 2013 to ban the sale of magazines that hold more than 15 rounds. Investigators have said Holmes’s 100-round magazine jammed during the attack, preventing even more bloodshed.

http://yahoonewsdigest-us.tumblr.com/po ... mmo-seller

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The Second Amendment Beyond The Doorstep: Concealed Carry Post-Heller

Nicholas Moeller

2014 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1401

This Note examines the approaches used by the Second and Seventh Circuits when weighing the constitutionality of concealed carry statutes. Moeller defines and explains the four differing types of concealed carry statutes that have been used in the United States, then tracks the use of those statutes through the country’s history. Next, he considers the precise reasoning of the Second and Seventh Courts and analyzes the Supreme Court’s precedent on the question, particularly in Heller. Additionally, he explores the understanding of the Second Amendment and its connection to concealed carry at the amendment’s ratification before closing with a look at the empirical arguments for and against concealed carry. Finally, Moeller recommends adoption by the Supreme Court of the Second Circuit standard, acknowledging the limited nature of any right to carry a weapon in public and reserving the question of concealed carry to state legislatures.

Full Article: https://www.illinoislawreview.org/artic ... st-heller/

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State Supreme Court debates Kissimmee 'stand your ground' case

Jeff Weiner - Orlando Sentinel - 12/2/14

Several state Supreme Court justices lamented the vague wording of Florida's "stand your ground" statute on Tuesday.

The court was considering the case of Jared Bretherick, who argues he was arrested while trying to protect his family in 2011.

The Brethericks, visiting from Avon, Ind., say they honked at an aggressive driver, who then pulled in front of them on U.S. Highway 192, stopped in traffic and exited his vehicle. After Bretherick's father showed the man a gun, he returned to his SUV and backed it up toward them, the family says.

When deputies arrived, they found Bretherick on foot alongside his family's truck, with the gun aimed toward the other driver's SUV. He was charged with aggravated assault and has since been denied immunity under "stand your ground."

Bretherick appealed, arguing those who claim self-defense should not have the burden to prove it, as they currently do in order to avoid a trial. Because the law promises "immunity," state prosecutors should have to disprove a self-defense claim at a pre-trial hearing, his attorneys say.

When "stand your ground" was written, it didn't specify how the courts would decide if someone acted in self-defense, or which side would have the burden of proof.

As a result, much of Tuesday's arguments were spent debating what the law was intended to do.

"It was intended to provide a true, real immunity," said Bretherick's lawyer, Eric Friday of Jacksonville.

Justice Barbara Pariente said that the Legislature "was silent on both the procedure and any pretrial… burden." Chief Justice Jorge Labarga said if legislators had weighed in on the subject "we would not be here today."

Several of the justices expressed concern that putting the immunity burden on the state would require prosecutors to present their entire case twice — once before a judge, to determine immunity, and again in front of a jury.

"How can [a judge] make that determination beyond a reasonable doubt unless you hear all the evidence?" Labarga asked.

Bretherick's lawyer countered that many so-called "stand your ground" hearings already resemble trials: "It is requiring multiday hearings already — where the defendant is bearing the burden of proof," Friday said.

Assistant Attorney General Kristen Davenport said there's no reason for the high court to change the way Florida judges have been determining immunity. If the legislature didn't like it, they could have passed a law to change it, she said.

"This procedure has been in place for four years and it's going as smoothly as can be expected," she argued.

http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/bre ... story.html

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THE QUIET ARMY: FELON FIREARM RIGHTS RESTORATION IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Robert Luther III - 23 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 237 (Oct. 2014)

Most states afford felons the opportunity to have their political disabilities removed or "rights restored" after they are released from incarceration. In every state within the jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, save Virginia, a felon's rights are partially restored automatically upon the completion of his sentence, parole, and probation. Absent a pardon, Virginia requires the felon to petition the Governor in writing through the Office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth in order to obtain a partial restoration of rights. 1 One such right that may or may not be restored upon a state-convicted felon's return to society is the right to ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms. While it is generally presumed to be illegal for felons to engage in any of those four activities in the states within the jurisdiction of the Fourth Circuit and nationwide, whether that is accurate in any specific case depends on a variety of factors including the scope of the rights restored by the state, the length of time the felon has conducted himself in a law-abiding manner, and any affirmative steps taken by the felon to remove any outstanding collateral firearms disabilities. Frequently, felons must take affirmative steps to secure a restoration of their firearm rights because most state restorations of political rights do not include the restoration of firearm rights, and even when a state restores some firearm rights, like the ability to use shotguns or rifles exclusively for hunting, the felon may still be subject to a federal firearm disability.

This Article discusses the restoration of firearm rights for felons and specifically addresses the methods by which individuals convicted of felonies under state law may be relieved of collateral federal firearms disabilities in the Fourth Circuit, with a particular emphasis on the practice in Virginia.

http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol23/iss1/12/



Mental Illness and the Second Amendment

Clayton Cramer - 46 Conn. L. Rev. 1301 (May, 2014)

HIGHLIGHT:

In the past, American laws seldom attempted to regulate the possession of firearms by the mentally ill. This surprising tradition has waned following a recent series of highly-publicized mass murders that were committed by persons who were identifiably mentally ill before the crime occurred. These tragedies have focused attention on the question of how a free society should handle the conflict between the Second Amendment's "right of the people" and the needs of public safety. This Article examines why mental health related firearm regulations suddenly became necessary, analyzes the attendant conflicts between civil liberties and public safety, and suggests some strategies to deal with these conflicts.

IX. CONCLUSION

All of these gun control-related measures are good, but they will do nothing for the 32.3% of murders that are committed without guns. 244 Nor will they do anything for murders committed by mentally incompetent persons who steal guns, as has been the case in at least two recent mass murders, 245 or who buy them on the black market. 246 Nor will background checks make a difference for persons who were not mentally ill when they purchased a gun. There is also reason to wonder whether mandatory firearms background checks actually do anything at all. 247

There is, however, something that has been demonstrated to make a difference: restoring our mental hospital system--and making it more humane and more transparent this time. This can be accompanied by involuntary outpatient commitment, which compels participation in outpatient treatment as a condition of not being involuntarily hospitalized. 248

As Harcourt's work strongly suggests, hospitalization reduces murder rates. 249 This is not surprising. It is far easier to prevent inmates in locked wards from getting weapons than it is to prevent the mentally incompetent from doing so in a free society. As Segal's work demonstrates, 250 not only is ease of involuntary commitment a statistically significant determinant of murder rates, but so are mental hospital bed availability and the quality of the mental health care system. This should also not be surprising.

If reducing murder rates were the only consequence of correcting the disastrous mistake of deinstitutionalization, it might be justifiable for that reason alone. That is not, however, the only social gain from reversing course on the failure of deinstitutionalization.

Reducing deaths from exposure should certainly qualify as a public good. For all the faults of the old state mental hospitals, patients did not freeze to death in them or regularly die of malnutrition, tuberculosis, or the other diseases that so often kill homeless people in America. Major mental illness is associated with a seven to twenty-four year decrease in lifespan. 251

Reversing deinstitutionalization will have an economic cost, that of rebuilding and staffing the now abandoned mental hospitals. But our current system is spending astonishing amounts of money right now dealing with the consequences of not institutionalizing the severely mentally ill.

Mental hospitals cost money. So do prosecutions of mentally ill offenders. The average U.S. criminal justice system cost for murder in 2008 dollars was $ 426,255. 252 In 2014 dollars, that would be $ 464,817. 253 It seems likely that these costs will be borne by the state because mentally ill defendants are frequently indigent, and thus receive public defenders. The United States had 12,664 murders in 2011. 254 If eighteen percent of those murders were by severely mentally ill offenders--a reasonable guess based on the Indiana murder convict data discussed above 255--that is $ 1.015 billion spent on trials that could often have been preventable.

Moreover, the costs of incarceration after conviction are substantial. Colorado is a pretty typical state; it currently spends $ 32,335 per year per inmate. 256 A mentally sane murderer who spends thirty years in prison will cost $ 970,060 in 2011 dollars. Multiplied by 2279 murders per year, this is a bill for $ 2.21 billion in current and accrued costs. However, states are required to provide mental health services for prisoners. 257 Mentally ill inmates are more expensive for states to care for than sane inmates. 258 Several years ago, Pennsylvania found that mentally ill prisoners cost $ 51,100 per year and sane prisoners $ 28,000 per year. 259 If a similar cost differential applies nationally, the incarceration bill is $ 4.03 billion a year in current and future costs. In light of these figures, trial costs plus current and future incarceration costs would total $ 6.24 billion per year.

If involuntary commitment of those with serious mental illness problems even prevented 455 murders a year (or twenty percent of the murders by severely mentally ill offenders) it could save taxpayers $ 547 million per year for trials and incarceration, perhaps less, depending on the number of plea bargains. That would pay for a lot of mental health services. Victim costs are not included in these estimates. It seems likely that anyone present at any of the recent mass murders would have gladly paid more taxes to hospitalize mentally ill persons before they opened fire.

Finally, there is one other reason to admit that deinstitutionalization was a mistake: the mentally ill homeless are parents, children, friends, siblings--often too violent for family or friends to shelter, but still people who deserve humane care, even if we cannot cure them. No one should be sleeping on a steam grate, eating out of a trashcan, or wondering whether he will survive the night. Not now. Not in our country.

Full article: http://connecticutlawreview.org/files/2 ... Cramer.pdf

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Making Second Amendment Law with First Amendment Rules: The Five-Tier Free Speech Framework and Public Forum Doctrine in Second Amendment Jurisprudence

Kenneth A. Klukowski - 93 Neb. L. Rev. (2014)

Abstract

The United States is half a decade into developing a jurisprudence applying the Second Amendment. Part II of this article sets forth the current state of the law on the Second Amendment. Part III discusses the proposed approach for Second Amendment judicial review, consisting of a three-step inquiry. These three steps dictate which of five levels of scrutiny should apply in any given case. Part IV explores the rationale and normative principles underlying this theory, including the desirable clarity of per se rules and the need to restore strict scrutiny to a test that is sufficiently strict to provide adequate protection for core exercises of fundamental rights. Part IV also acknowledges three differences between the First and Second Amendments that suggest areas on the margins where the jurisprudence of the two Amendments might diverge. Part V expounds the three levels of scrutiny that apply to burdens on Second Amendment exercises on private property. Part VI explains how public forum doctrine offers two additional standards of review that apply on public property. Finally, Part VII concludes with a discussion on how courts should proceed regarding the Second Amendment.

Full Article: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol93/iss2/5


State of Madness: Mental Health and Gun Regulations

Steven W. Dulan - 31 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 1 (2014)

One important issue in this Article is the use of mental-health diagnoses to limit the lawful possession and carry of firearms, whether for self-defense or another purpose. Recently there have been many calls for the disarmament of all “mentally ill” persons. This Article explores current problems, using the author’s clients as examples, and advocates that statutes and regulations should clearly distinguish between mental illness and danger to oneself or others.

A Liberal’s Case for the Second Amendment

Craig R. Whitney - 31 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 15 (2014)

Gun control alone can never eliminate all gun violence. This Article discusses today’s gun-violence problem and the role of assault rifles in mass shootings. And the common thread among mass shooters is more often untreated mental illness, not use of “assault” rifles.

Gun Owners, Gun Legislation, and Compromise

David T. Hardy - 31 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 33

An important human aspect of firearms ownership and regulation includes the reluctance of gun owners to consent to measures that, viewed in historical isolation, appear quite limited. This Article debates the compromise between gun owners and restrictive gun legislation and how these restrictions serve no discernible purpose except to make legal firearm ownership as difficult, expensive, and legally risky as possible.

The Illustrated Second Amendment - Part I

Robert J. McWhirter - 51(6) Arizona Attorney 22 (Feb. 2015)

Nobody really wants the Second Amendment.

On the one hand are the gun controlists, armed with violence statistics, who say it is all about “a well regu- lated militia.” They ignore, or at the least find incon- venient, the part that says “the right of the People to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” So every kid doesn’t get to take an AK-47 to school for show- and-shoot day!

On the other hand are the “individual rightists” who say it’s all about “the right of the People to keep and bear arms” and “that militia stuff is just what we call our gun club!”3 Gun rights groups have long wished that the Framers had used different language to make their right more explicit. If courts would just give the Second Amendment its “original intent,” they argue, their right would be secure.

http://www.azattorneymag-digital.com/az ... 1502/#pg25

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Disarming the Dangerous: Preventing Extraordinary and Ordinary Violence

Mary D. Fan - 90 Indiana Law Journal, 2014, Forthcoming

Abstract:

Recent mass shootings at Navy Yard, Newtown, Aurora and elsewhere have jolted Congress and the states into considering gun violence prevention. More than 1,500 gun-related bills have been introduced since 2013, after the slaughter in Newtown of twenty elementary school children and six adults. Current legislation and debates are shaped by the specter of a heavily armed, mentally ill individual hunting in public places such as schools, businesses, and workplaces. In the states, the most successful type of legislation involves firearms restrictions for the mentally ill. In Congress, the legislation that garnered the most debate was a ban on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines. While the national attention to firearms violence prevention is salutary, for law and policy to tackle the core of the problem it is important to address two empirical questions: Who are the dangerous individuals committing most firearms homicides and why do the law’s current screens miss them?

This article draws on data from the National Violent Death Reporting System to answer the crucial foundational questions of who poses a danger and why the dangerous slip through existing legal screens. Presenting data on the most prevalent place of shooting, victim-shooter relationship, and the shooter’s prior history, the article shows that prevention of extraordinarily devastating firearms violence calls for attention to how the nation addresses “ordinary” violence. By ordinary violence, this article means violence that is often viewed as mundane, such as altercations between family members, friends and intimates in the home. Many perpetrators of firearms homicide have a history of such prior events – yet a substantially smaller proportion of these violent episodes have been adjudicated, thereby slipping through existing screens for firearms restrictions. Based on these findings, the article discusses how discretion in dealing with “ordinary violence” can improve detection of the dangerous regardless of whether proposed firearms restrictions survive the gauntlet for new gun laws.

Full Article: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? ... id=2437562


Guns Don’t Kill People, 3D Printing Does? Why the Technology is a Distraction from Effective Gun Controls

Rory K. Little - 65 Hastings L.J. 1505

3D printing is technology that allows three-dimensional physical objects to be created by using a relatively small and inexpensive machine that looks much like a desktop paper printer. 3D printers have already been used to create guns and shotgun cartridges (but not ammunition), and the prospect that criminals will be able to “print” operational weapons at home has regulators in a tizzy. Some argue that 3D printing should be highly regulated to avoid such dangers.

In this Essay invoking Bewitched as the theoretical example of instantaneous 3D printing, Professor Little argues that gun control advocates should focus primarily on regulating criminal use of guns, and not on the technology used to manufacture them. Paper printers can be used to create instruments of fraud, but we do not ban paper printing at home. New technology has always stimulated fears. But criminal law properly focuses on the products of technology and their criminal uses. We should celebrate technological innovation and attempt to regulate its misuse without inhibiting creative development.

Full Article: http://www.hastingslawjournal.org/wp-co ... e-65.6.pdf




McWhirter, Robert James, Bills, quills, and stills : an annotated, illustrated, and illuminated history of the Bill of Rights

http://billofrightshistory.com/index.php/en/novels

CONTENTS

• Of dogma and desire : saying what you believe about the First Amendment
  Shooting your mouth off about the Second Amendment
  The Third Amendment : don't count it out yet!
  Molasses and the sticky origins of the Fourth Amendment
  From testicles to dragnet : how the Fifth Amendment protects all of us
  How the Sixth Amendment guarantees you a court, a lawyer, and a chamber pot
  Trial by jury or . . . by God!
  "Baby, don't be cruel" : what's so cruel and unusual about the Eighth Amendment?
  The Ninth Amendment : still a mystery after all these years
  "Are you talkin' to me?" : just who are those "people" in the Tenth amendment?

http://www.amazon.com/Bills-Quills-Stil ... 1614383804

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THE NEW YORK SAFE ACT: A THOUGHTFUL APPROACH TO GUN CONTROL, OR A POLITICALLY EXPEDIENT RESPONSE TO THE PUBLIC'S FEAR OF THE MENTALLY ILL?

Matthew Gamsin - 88 S. Cal. L. Rev. 16 (2015)

In response to the public's fear of gun violence by individuals with mental illness, the New York legislature adopted the New York Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement Act of 2013 ("SAFE Act"). 8 A portion of the SAFE Act provides that designated "mental health professionals" who believe that a patient is "likely to engage in conduct that would result in serious harm to self or others" must report the patient to the Director of Community Services ("Director") who, if he or she agrees, must then report to the Division of Criminal Justice Services ("DCJS"). 9 Under the SAFE Act, once a report is referred to the DCJS, the patient's gun license, which is required to lawfully possess a firearm under [*18] New York law, will be revoked and his or her gun will be seized. 10

Critics question the constitutionality of the SAFE Act and also argue that it is bad policy. Mental health professionals and organizations that support the rights of the mentally ill assert that mental illness plays a very small role in gun violence. 11 They believe that the reporting provisions of the SAFE Act interfere with the patient-therapist relationship, discourage those in need of therapy from seeking mental health treatment, and inappropriately focus the gun-control debate on possession by the mentally ill. 12

This Note will first review the historical development of gun-control laws in the United States, including those referred to by the Supreme Court as "longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by . . . the mentally ill." 13 It will then analyze the extent to which the SAFE Act differs from such longstanding prohibitions and whether the Act is constitutional. Finally, this Note will consider whether, regardless of its constitutionality, the SAFE Act is an appropriate legislative response to gun violence or whether a recent proposal by a group of national experts on mental illness and gun violence might be more effective and more likely to pass constitutional muster.

http://lawreview.usc.edu/wp-content/upl ... nline1.pdf

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Statutory Restrictions on Concealed Carry: A Five-Circuit Shoot Out

Justine E. Johnson-Makuch - 83 Fordham L. Rev. 2757 (2015)

Abstract

In District of Columbia v. Heller, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified a citizen’s core Second Amendment right to keep a firearm at home; however, the Court left open the question of how the Second Amendment applies beyond the home. Since Heller, lower courts have struggled to determine the constitutionality of concealed carry laws in light of this new understanding of the Second Amendment.

Many states have enacted laws that restrict a citizen’s ability to obtain a concealed carry permit, and some of the restrictions are not controversial, such as the requirements to be above a certain age and have a clean criminal record. However, concealed carry laws also involve more contentious requirements, such as New Jersey’s “justifiable need” and New York’s “good cause” requirements. One concealed carry law reviewed by lower courts was so restrictive that it amounted to a full ban on carrying firearms in public. Citizens who have been denied concealed carry permits challenged the constitutionality of these laws.

This Note summarizes five federal circuits’ decisions regarding such challenges to statutory restrictions on concealed carry of handguns. Three of these circuit courts found the laws constitutional, while two held that the laws were unconstitutional. After this Note considers how each court reached its decision and why these courts reached differing results, it ultimately evaluates and critiques the circuit court opinions.

http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol83/iss5/20