Well, maybe this particular pillar isn't knocked over, but they're at least chipping away at the base.... a new study in our closest ancestors suggests that we may also not be alone in our awareness that others may have different thoughts, experiences and views of the world than we do. The study . . . aimed to prove this question of consciousness by looking at whether great apes recognize “theory of mind”—that is, the understanding that others have their own (presumably different) minds.
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For the study, Buttelmann and his coauthors trained chimpanzees, bonobos and orangutans to help a person unlock two boxes, one of which had an object placed in them. . . .
The researchers then introduced the actual test. First, a research assistant placed an object in one of the two boxes, with a second person then moving the object to the other box. In one experiment, the first person would remain in the room while this switch happened, and then go to open to the box they originally put the object in (the "true belief" experiment). In the second, the first person would be out of the room while the switch happened, and then go for the original box (the "false belief" experiment).
They found that the first person was more likely to receive help—in the form of the ape unlocking the correct box for them—when it appeared that the person had a "false belief" about which box their object was in.
By contrasting a "true belief" person with a "false belief" person, Buttelmann . . . was able to show that "it is their understanding of the experimenter" that leads the apes to choose which box they do. They're less likely to help a person who knows where the object is because they know that person isn't confused—or so the logic goes.
... these sorts of tests are always open to interpretation, says Robert Lurz, a philosopher at Brooklyn College .... Lurz says that how to interpret the behavior of these apes is not a settled question yet.
...the apes' actions don't necessarily prove that they're actually recognizing false beliefs in the experimenters. "They might just infer that the experimenter wants the object because she returns to the box where she last saw the object placed," he says. "That’s a pretty good reason to think that she wants the object."
At the same time, Lurz said he was impressed by how the researchers designed this kind of experiment. "It is very difficult to design valid theory-of-mind test for animals," he says. "And so I applaud [the study's] use of an innovative procedure for testing false-belief attribution in apes."
How will these kinds of discoveries about the mental powers of animals shape our attitudes toward them over the long term?
