Interesting to think that the military doctrine of "nuking back Russia to the stoneage" was the reason why those precious nukes weren't used in a tactical/operational environment in Korea. Especially after Cuban Missile Crisis the way people felt about nukes had changed. It wasn't anymore natural to use nuclear weapons.Smitty-48 wrote:I would say the main issue in 1953, was just the limited number of bombs available, these bombs were supposed to be for fighting World War Three if necessary, Korea itself wasn't World War Three, so unless and until it escalated beyond the Korean Peninsula, the Americans were loathe to use their bombs, because they just didn't have that many of them at this juncture.
And, as I said, they are furiously working on the hydrogen bomb, but in terms of being a deliverable weapon which could be dropped from a bomber, having that in significant quantities is also some years off yet at this point.
If the Americans dropped all the atomic bombs they had in 1953, that wouldn't even amount to one hydrogen bomb worth of firepower, Castle Bravo was twice as powerful as all the atomic bombs in the 1953 arsenal combined.
Yet the late 40's and 50's was a time when the use of nuclear weapons were truly thought to be used as an extension of firepower, as quite "conventional" weapons. The interesting debate around supporting the French forces in Dien Bien Phu with nukes is interesting too. See for example "We might give them a few." Did the US offer to drop atom bombs at Dien Bien Phu?
No nukes saved the French from this defeat: